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Abstract
By examining the gold leasing market and employing data on the gold forward offered rate
(GOFO) and derived lease rates, we propose that rather than using the interest-adjusted
basis as a proxy for the convenience yield of gold, the convenience yield is better approx-
imated by the derived gold lease rate. Additionally, using the interest-adjusted basis as
opposed to the lease rate can lead to incorrect inferences pertaining to the convenience
yield. Using the lease rate, we study the relationship between gold leasing and the level of
COMEX discretionary inventory. The results suggest that the lease rate has an asymmet-
ric relationship with the level of discretionary inventory, which we calculate using weekly
inventory data obtained from the COMEX futures trading exchange. Linear regressions of
the level of discretionary inventory on lagged lease rates reveal that lease rate tenors of 1, 3
and 6 months have a negative effect on the level of discretionary inventory. After control-
ling for speculative effects we find that for bullion leases exceeding one month in duration
inventory levels are dominated by speculative effects rather than lease rates. Furthermore,
this speculative activity acts to increase the amount of bullion available to the gold futures
market by decreasing the repayment effect. Finally, we show that the presence of specula-
tion in gold futures contracts can be associated with increased futures contract returns and
that this effect increases with increased futures contract maturity. These results suggest that
speculation plays a significant role in the COMEX gold futures market.
Key words: commitments of traders, gold futures market, convenience yield, gold leasing,
speculative effects
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Re´sume´
A` travers l’examen du marche´ de l’emprunt d’or et l’utilisation a` la fois des donne´es rela-
tives aux taux a` terme offerts sur ce marche´ (GOFO) et aux taux du leasing de l’or, nous
sugge´rons l’adoption de ce dernier taux comme e´tant une << proxy >> pour quantifier
le rendement de l’or. Une telle approche permet de reme´dier aux insuffisances d’une ap-
pxoximation par un adjustement du diffe´rentiel de taux (interest-adjusted basis). En effet,
l’utilisation de ce dernier est sujette a` des biais d’infe´rence aboutissant a` une estimation
errone´e du rendement de l’actif en question. Dans ce contexte, il est naturel d’utiliser le
taux le plus approprie´, en l’occurrence le taux d’emprunt (lease rate) pour e´tudier la re-
lation entre l’emprunt de l’or et le niveau d’inventaire du COMEX. Enfin, notre analyse
re´ve`le qu la pre´sence de spe´culateurs sur les marche´s des contrats a` terme est un facteur
d’accroissement a` la fois des rendements, mais aussi des maturite´s des contrats futures.
Mots cle´s: commitments of traders, marche´ a` terme de l’or, convenience yield, gold leas-
ing, effets spe´culatifs
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Introduction
Human civilization is enamoured with gold. Besides its widespread usage as adornment,
it also represents a precious and long-lasting store of value. But this is not a modern
ideal. The use of gold as a store of value1 and as the basis for a stable monetary system
can be traced to ancient times. The first evidence of gold being used as currency dates to
roughly 630 BCE in a region then known as Lydia. The coins of Lydia were minted from
a naturally occurring alloy of gold and silver called electrum. In an attempt to stabilize
the metal content of these ancient coins, the ruler of Lydia, Croesus, would manipulate the
currency, actually reducing the gold content as discussed in Lewis (2007). This resulted
in coins with a face value that exceeded the value of their gold composition. In order to
maintain the artificial value of the coin, the government passed laws to control the minting
of the coins. Perhaps somewhat unrecognizable to us now, this monopolistic system, in a
more democratic form, would eventually form the basis of our modern monetary system.
Gold is unique among commodities in that nearly all the gold ever extracted is still
thought to exist aboveground, for a distinguishing property of gold is that, unlike agricul-
tural commodities, it does not degrade over time. Bullion can be stored almost indefinitely
and requires very little maintenance. This particular attribute of gold leads to another im-
portant aspect of gold, namely the existence of vast aboveground inventories that dwarf
annual gold mine production. These large inventories of gold can be quickly and easily
brought to market to counter any excess demand or supply shocks that may arise. This is a
1As opposed to stocks which represent a return on value.
1
2remarkable feature that distinguishes the gold market from the typical non-precious metal2
and agricultural commodity markets. For example, agricultural markets and inventories ex-
hibit strong seasonality while the non-precious metals markets are sensitive to annual mine
production, supply and demand shocks, and degradation over time. Because gold is such
a unique commodity, more akin to a financial asset, conventional commodity price models
based on the theory of storage fail to accurately represent the dynamics and stylized facts
of the historical gold price see, for example, the papers by Casassus and Collin-Dufresne
(2005), Schwartz (1997), Salant and Henderson (1978), and Fama and French (1988).
The gold market of today is a much different market than the gold market of 10 years
ago. The New York Commodity Exchange (COMEX), is witnessing historically low lease
rates, decreasing hedging activity and steadily rising non-commercial open interest. For a
market that was once dominated by commercial3 futures contracts, this is a fundamental
change in the status quo. This ever-increasing percentage of non-commercial open interest
results from the increased activities of two new classes of gold investor: gold exchange
traded funds (ETF) and non-commercial speculators. With their recent proliferation and
rising influence, ETFs are playing an ever more prominent and escalating role in the com-
plex dynamics that now affect the price of gold. Speculators are also betting on the gold
price in increasing numbers as commodities become commonplace in investment portfo-
lios. This is an unprecedented shift in the composition of gold investors. The gold market,
once the domain of an eclectic group colloquially known as “gold bugs”, is now readily ac-
cessible by any investor looking to put money into gold bullion. Historically, central banks
and bullion banks were the primary gold trading agents, but with gold investment demand
increasing and trades being facilitated by electronic trading platforms, non-traditional in-
vestors are seeking to put their capital into gold. The rapidly changing role of gold from
monetary reserve to investment asset is exerting unique pressures on the gold market that
2Copper or zinc, for example.
3As opposed to non-commercial positions.
3could completely change how gold is traded on the commodity exchange. We may, in fact,
come to eventually perceive gold as a financial investment rather than a commodity in the
traditional sense.
Before the increase in investor interest and the creation of ETFs, central banks and
bullion banks were among the largest operators in the gold futures market. Indeed, prior to
the Washington Agreement on Gold sales in 1999, central banks bought and sold significant
quantities of gold thereby either directly or indirectly affecting the price of bullion. This
idea that central bank sales could impact the price of gold was studied more specifically in a
paper by Salant and Henderson (1978). In their work, Salant and Henderson found that the
risk of a future government gold auction served to depress the price of gold yet, under some
circumstances, it could also pressure the price of gold to rise (in percentage terms) at a rate
that exceeded the real rate of interest. These results lead Salant and Henderson to suggest
that that the Hotelling (1931) model of exhaustible resources is unable to properly describe
gold price movements. Specifically, it is not capable of predicting the observed increases
in the gold price that occur at rates exceeding the prevailing rate of interest. Salant et al.
suggested this may be due to the non-negligible, and increasing, costs of gold extraction
and, additionally, the fact that governments may sell some portion of their gold stock to the
private sector, thereby rendering the exact government inventory of gold uncertain. Thus
we seem to be left with an incomplete story. Specifically, the full mechanism of gold price
formation is not well-understood. This is complicated by a noticeable and distinct absence
of literature focused on gold. we argue that additional factors, as of yet unaccounted for in
the literature, may also play a role in bullion price formation. In fact, an interesting aspect
of this argument is that speculators, who are not constrained by extraction or storage costs,
may be able to constrain the price of gold and prevent it from rising, in percentage terms,
at a rate exceeding the rate of interest. To our knowledge, no satisfactory or comprehensive
analysis of this finding has been treated in the literature to date and could suggest that the
presence and influence of speculative behaviour in the gold market influences price. With
4this work we hop to contribute an original and in-depth examination of the bullion market
and the factors influencing the price of gold. To this end, we first turn our attention to the
possible influences that speculative activities may have on the bullion markets.
Chapter 1
Does Speculative Activity Affect the
Price of Futures Contracts?
The question is ubiquitous in the financial press. Everyday the financial media reports
that speculators are playing a role in the latest commodity price increases and this senti-
ment is not restricted to any particular commodity market. Rather remarkably, the issue
has a long history in the literature: Machlup (1969) had published ”Speculations on Gold
Speculation”! However, to some observers, the net effect of speculative activity in com-
modities markets appears difficult to gauge. A certain a number of analysts and individuals
even believe that excessive levels of speculation exert a negative influence on markets by
driving up the price of commodities. For example, as recently as 2006, the United States
Senate commissioned a report on the speculative activity occurring in the oil and gas mar-
kets1 Although the report was inconclusive regarding the exact extent and level of harmful
speculation, the recommendations were clear: provide the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) with stricter oversight and control of the futures market. In regard to
the potential impact on the financial markets, the senate report immediately raises several
1The Role of Market Speculation in Rising Oil and Gas Prices: A Need to Put the Cop Back on the Beat.
Staff report prepared by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, June 27, 2006.
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6important questions. Are these controls necessary? Is speculation actually having a tangi-
ble effect on commodity prices? And, if so, by what mechanism does speculation influence
price? In the analysis that follows, we endeavour to contribute to this debate.
In his theory of normal backwardation, Keynes (1930) proposed the explanation that
speculators act as the market counterpart to hedgers and thus they play a necessary and
important service in the day-to-day operation of the commodity markets. According to
this theory, speculators are an essential participant in commodity markets. In order to
reduce their risk, hedgers take long positions in the underlying commodity. Consequently,
there is a need for a category of traders willing to take the associated long futures contract
positions2. This class of traders is referred to as the speculators. In this Keynesian world,
the incentive to take on hedgers’ risk is that speculators require that the futures price be
less than the expected future spot price at the contract maturity. This implies that futures
prices are downward-biased expectations of future spot prices, the bias being interpreted as
a risk-premium. The debate over the existence of this risk-premium has a lengthy tradition
in the financial literature and continues to this day.
Kaldor (1939) was one of the first authors to examine the effects of market speculation
on economic stability. In defining speculation as:
”...the purchase (or sale) of goods with a view to re-sale (re-purchase) at a
later date, where the motive behind such action is the expectation of a change
in the relevant prices relatively to the ruling price and not a gain accruing
through their use, or any kind of transformation effected in them or their trans-
fer between different markets.”
Kaldor argued that there exists a range of price oscillations such that within this range,
speculation acts to stabilize prices. Kaldor further argued that this price range varies in
size and level across markets and exhibits a spill over effect on supply and demand, and
2i.e. the counterparty
7hence inventory stocks, across commodity markets. The resulting asymmetric responses in
stock levels across markets, he argues, lead to price stability in commodity markets. This
cross-market stock variability is thus a possible mechanism by which speculators can affect
market dynamics, and highlights the importance of inventories in influencing commodity
markets.
In a relatively early paper, Working (1953) tried to distinguish the respective importance
of the roles of speculation and hedging in the commodity markets, suggesting that evidence
gathered at the time favoured the view of speculation following hedging or, put in another
way, the speculators went to where the hedgers were. In fact, Working suggested that
the then traditional view of hedging as an activity meant to offset risk may not have been
accurate. He stated that a more accurate depiction of hedging in commodity futures is that
it is an activity involving:
”...the purchase or sale of futures in conjunction with another commitment,
usually in the expectation of a favourable change in the relation between spot
and futures prices.”
Working’s definition thus portrays hedging as an activity akin to speculation as defined by
Kaldor. Working goes on to suggest that one way through which speculation can induce
price changes is if large-scale mismanagement of stocks3 takes place in a futures market
highly utilized for hedging. The gold futures market has, historically, been such a market.
To study speculative effects, Working proposed to quantify ”excessive” price fluctuations
in a commodity by measuring the amount of fluctuation in price occurring in excess of price
fluctuations that could be attributed to unpredictable changes in economic fundamentals.
However, his numerical evidence was weak and Working was forced to concede that the
evidence in favour of speculative effects on futures prices was at best anecdotal but this was
due more to a lack of appropriate data than anything else.
3Such stocks are referred to by Kaldor as ”speculative stocks”.
8Houthakker (1957) was among the first authors to introduce the use of trader commit-
ment data to the study of market speculators. Although his work was concerned with the
estimation of the profits and losses of speculators, it served to illustrate that open interest
commitment data could be successfully employed to study the effects of speculation in the
futures market. The work of Houthakker lays the groundwork for our methodology.
In this paper we restrict our study of speculation to the gold futures market for several
reasons. A key one is that gold, unlike other commodities, behaves more as an asset than
a true commodity. For example, gold in central bank inventories can be leased in order to
earn a return, yet this differs from the concept of convenience yield developed in the theory
of storage. Reinforcing this point, authors such as Casassus and Collin-Dufresne (2005)
find that the long-run mean of the convenience yield of gold is nearly indistinguishable
from zero. According to Solt and Swanson (1981), a key difference between gold and
other financial assets is that gold is an asset with an inherent value whereas other financial
assets represent contingent claims.
Another characteristic of the gold price is that it lacks a seasonal component that could
potentially mask speculative effects. Agricultural and energy commodities exhibit strong
seasonal patters in relation to weather, whereas evidence for seasonality in the gold market
is weak. Lucey and Tully (2006) find weak evidence of a Monday effect in gold futures
trading but report no conclusive evidence of a long-term seasonal price behaviour. Simi-
larly, Tschoegl (1987) finds no evidence of a monthly seasonal effect in gold futures over
the period from January 1975 to December 1984 despite having employed three different
definitions of seasonality.
As a result of its physical properties, almost all the gold ever mined survives in vast
aboveground inventories. Owing to this durability, gold does not deteriorate over time
and, consequently, financial institutions hold large stocks of gold that do not suffer from
depreciation or spoilage; its value being tied to the spot price. Gold inventory levels are
therefore quite stable and do not run any significant risk of sudden, unexpected changes.
9Indeed, as described in Salant and Henderson (1978), any large governmental sales of gold
are announced in advance. As we have argued, speculators may affect the rate of increase of
the gold price. In studying the efficiency of the gold and silver markets, Solt and Swanson
(1981) reach a similar conclusion, arguing that trading in gold and silver is, perhaps, more
of a speculative, rather than an investment, activity.
Prior work on the effects of speculation in metals markets was carried out by Kocagil
(1997). Kocagil tested the hypothesis that increased speculation in the metals futures mar-
kets acts to stabilize spot price volatility. He developed a rational expectations model that
included producers (short hedgers), inventory holders consumers and producers. He de-
fined the speculative intensity as the sensitivity of open futures positions to the spread
between the futures and expected spot price. His results suggested a rejection of the above
hypothesis, indicating that speculation increases spot price volatility and thus has a desta-
bilizing effect on price.
In a paper studying commodity futures price volatility, Fama and French (1987) con-
sidered the role that volatility plays in the dynamics of commodity futures. Using futures
spreads, they demonstrated that the conditional variance of futures prices increased with
the current price of the commodity. In addition, they showed that the basis variation of
gold futures prices was almost completely explained by the interest rate. Further evidence
of the importance of volatility over convenience yield in metals futures prices comes from
Fama and French (1988). Using regressions, they showed that there was little support for
the theory of storage in explaining the price movements of the precious metals. Their ex-
planation for this finding was that the low storage costs of the precious metals relative to
their inherent value results in limitations on the variance of convenience yields and, conse-
quently, in the interest-adjusted basis. As a result, it is possible that the low storage costs of
gold depress convenience yields to near zero which is consistent with the finding of Fama
and French (1988) that spot and forward prices for gold exhibit a near one-to-one variation.
All these sentiments were shared by Gehr and Martell (1994) who interviewed traders
10
in order to assess the impact of derivative usage on the spot price of gold. It is clear that
gold market liquidity has been significantly increased as a result of extensive derivative
trading. Such a well-developed derivatives market would make a welcoming environment
for the operation of speculative agents. However, further research is required in order to
corroborate such findings.
One early analysis of the economics of gold prices was given by Abken (1980). Abken’s
analysis of gold price movements is based on the idea that price movements can be ex-
plained as a consequence of rational behaviour by economic agents participating in a spec-
ulative market. The intuition is that the only return that gold yields is that return resulting
from an anticipated increase in the future price of gold. Because rational agents are profit
maximizing, they will store a quantity of gold whose storage costs are such that the an-
ticipated appreciation of the gold price will offset any marginal costs associated with the
storage of gold. Abken further argues that rational agent behaviour during times of uncer-
tainty will lead to excess demand for gold as a store of value, thereby driving up the spot
price and causing stored gold to be brought to market. This will act to restore equilibrium in
the market so that the anticipated price increase no longer exceeds the interest rate. Using
linear regressions, Abken tries to identify the factors responsible for gold price movements,
specifically percentage monthly changes in the spot price of gold. He considers yield rates
on one month-maturity Treasury Bills, lagged spot prices and lagged futures prices for the
period of January 1973 to December 1979 for the former and September 1975 to December
1979 for the latter. However, one problem facing Abken is a lack of data. For example, his
regressions involving the futures prices contain a total of 18 observations. This manifests
itself as a weakness in the results. He finds that the coefficients on lagged percentages
price changes are non-significantly different from zero, while the coefficients for the cur-
rent interest rate are significant at the 90 percent level of confidence. He reports an value
of 0.039 for the regressions on interest rate and past price changes. His regressions on past
futures prices show little improvement in explanatory power and exhibit that the spot price
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behaviour of gold cannot solely depend upon lagged values of the futures prices.
In the next two chapters we introduce the quantities and variables that will be central to
our empirical analysis: speculative pressure and the interest rates quoted in the gold market.
We will see that these quantities play a critical role in the formation of gold prices.
Chapter 2
On Speculative Pressure and its Possible
Effects
The gold futures market has undergone significant change in the last two decades. Cur-
rently, the market is dominated by non-commercial long futures contracts and is now wit-
nessing strictly positive speculative pressure over extended periods of time. This is a sig-
nificant break from the historical precedent of high levels of hedging activity.
Keynes’ theory of normal backwardation implies that the net supply of commercial
futures contracts, or hedging pressure, affects the equilibrium futures price path, thereby
leading to a rise (or fall) in futures prices over time. This equilibrium trend can be inter-
preted as the risk-premium. When hedgers take long positions, the equilibrium achieved
is such that futures prices tend to decrease over time. Conversely, in a market where short
hedging dominates, futures prices tend to increase over time.
Not all market agents can freely diversify their portfolios and, as a result, a price bias
is created. In a Keynesian world, producers will hedge their short positions by taking
a corresponding long futures position in the commodity or physical. The resulting net
supply of futures contracts, termed the hedging pressure, creates a downward pressure on
the expected future spot price at maturity. This downward pressure appears as a bias and is
12
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termed normal backwardation.
Speculators are another type of market agent that takes long positions in futures mar-
kets. They are assumed to be risk-averse and in order to enter into the long futures position,
they require a premium as compensation for the risk that they bear. In this manner they are
compensated by a positive expected profit, the aforementioned risk-premium. However,
speculators are not the only agents that will enter into long futures positions. Producers
facing inventory problems may also take long futures positions. Combined, both produc-
ers’ and speculators’ long positions can result in an upward bias, or contango, in futures
prices. This situation can be particularly acute when inventories are more variable than
prices. It is evident then, that upward or downward bias in prices can result from aggregate
long or short futures positions.
Optimal hedging to speculation ratios and the existence of risk-premiums are two im-
portant topics in the study of futures markets. In reviewing the Keynesian idea of normal
backwardation, Hirschleifer (1990) studied the effects of hedging pressure on futures price
formation. It is known that both consumers and producers hedge in the futures market and
that the hedging activity of the respective groups is counteractive. Under the assumption of
substantial setup costs, Hirschleifer developed a model of the futures market that accounts
for the non-participation of consumers. He showed that producer hedging would dominate
consumer hedging under significant costs, thereby restoring the downward bias in futures
prices. In other words, consumers become discouraged by short-hedging and increase their
long futures positions. Consequently, he shows that futures hedging is dependent on trad-
ing costs that are not symmetric between consumers and producers and these asymmetries
arise from the different hedging incentives between the two groups.
In support of the hedging pressure hypothesis, Bessembinder (1992) found that returns
in the foreign exchange and agricultural commodity markets vary with the net holdings of
hedgers, thus adding further evidence that hedging pressure influences risk-premiums. Us-
ing cross-sectional commodity data along with trader position data, Bessembinder showed
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that hedging pressure has explanatory power for risk premiums. More specifically, he found
that unconditional futures returns have mean returns that do not differ significantly from
zero. Conversely, when those returns are conditioned on hedging pressure, he reported
that mean futures returns are significantly different than zero. He extended the results of
Hirschleifer with the finding that hedging pressure may have a much broader scope; it
extends beyond the commodity market and into the foreign exchange futures markets.
In recent work on hedging effects, de Roon, Nijman and Veld (2000) modeled the re-
turns on a portfolio consisting of non-marketable risks, investment assets and futures con-
tracts. Such a model allows for a relationship between the risk-premium and the hedging
pressure, which is calculated using bi-monthly observations of trader positions taken from
the CFTC position data. Their model is constructed such that hedging pressure arises from
risks that agents either do not, or cannot, hedge as a result of market frictions or transaction
costs. Under such assumptions, de Roon et al. show that hedging pressure leads to price
bias. They also find that returns are influenced by hedging pressure, but not just hedging
pressure in the commodity’s own market, but rather across commodity markets.
By controlling for price pressure, measured as a change in hedging pressure, de Roon
et al. show that hedging pressure is responsible for the formation of price bias in futures
prices. Additionally, they find that hedging pressure influences not just futures returns, but
returns on the underlying asset of the futures contract.
To understand how speculative agents can affect the gold futures market, we examine
the open interest data from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Com-
mitment of Traders (CoT) report. The CoT report contains open interest data regarding the
various trading positions of the futures market for gold1. The open interest data is separated
1In the CFTC CoT report, there are multiple categories of data. We are interested in commercial and non-
commercial (all) data. The category denoted by “other” is not utilized in this paper but contains information
regarding the remaining futures contracts. In short, this category contains traders not categorized as either
“long” or “short” under the CFTC reporting framework. Specifically, we use non-commercial long, short and
spread (all), commercial long and short (all) and non-reporting long and short (all). We also use the data for
total open interest (all).
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into various categories that represent the possible trading positions. These are subsequently
decomposed into various reporting categories themselves. The primary distinction is be-
tween reportable and non-reportable positions. Reportable positions can be further parti-
tioned into commercial and non-commercial positions. According to CFTC regulations,
commercial positions consist of those market positions used primarily for hedging2. We
thus identify commercial open interest with hedging activity. Conversely, non-commercial
positions are identified with speculative activity. This category includes positions taken by
speculative institutions like hedge funds, for example. The classification is not rigorous,
however, as some commercial positions may be speculative in nature while some non-
commercial positions may be associated with hedging activity3. It is therefore important
to be aware that some cross-position contamination may be present in the open interest
data. Nonetheless, these classifications can be further subdivided into long, short and in
the case of the non-commercial data, spread positions. These data comprise a subset of the
total open interest. Aggregate activity by hedge funds and other institutions can increase
the speculative activity, resulting in a net positive number of long futures contracts in com-
parison to short futures contracts. Subsequently, it is possible to calculate a measure of
the excess of long contracts over short contracts. To quantify the speculative activity in
the gold futures market we define the speculative pressure as the analogue to the hedging
pressure of de Roon et al. (2000). The speculative pressure, 푡, is given by Equation (2.1):
푡 =
푁퐶 푙표푛푔,푎푙푙푡 −푁퐶푠ℎ표푟푡,푎푙푙푡
푁퐶 푙표푛푔,푎푙푙푡 +푁퐶
푠ℎ표푟푡,푎푙푙
푡 + 2푁퐶
푠푝푟푒푎푑,푎푙푙
푡
(2.1)
The speculative pressure can be considered a measure as to whether the market can be
characterized as either net long speculation or net short hedging if the open interest of
2We refer to the definition of a “hedging transaction“ as specified in the CFTC Electronic Code of Fed-
eral Regulations (e-CFR) section 1221(b)(2)(A). This definition details a “hedging transaction” to be “any
transaction that a taxpayer enters into in the normal course of the taxpayer’s trade or business primarily[for
various risk management activities]”.
3For example, we know that banks sometimes hedge because they have an OTC contract with a customer
who may be hedging or speculating. Consequently, this blurs the distinction between hedgers and speculators
and results in noisy speculator (i.e. non-commercial) data.
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reporting speculative long open interest4 exceeds (or is less than) speculative short open
interest. This interpretation is backed by the work of Hirshleifer (1990) who identifies
hedging pressure with the supply of futures contracts. Hirshleifer states that high values of
hedging pressure result in a decrease in futures prices in comparison to the expected future
spot price. The result of this property is the existence of a downward bias that is present in
futures prices.
4i.e. non-commercial long open interest
Chapter 3
Central Banks and the Gold Leasing
Market
For most of its existence, the gold futures market was used for the gold carry trade1. The
carry trade was facilitated by central banks wishing to earn a return on their bullion inven-
tories. This trade involved borrowing gold from the inventories of central banks that were
interested in generating a return on their bullion inventories and consisted of either leasing
or swapping gold in exchange for a fee. The gold could be leased at a relatively low rate
from the central bank and then sold quickly on the spot market. The proceeds from such
a sale could then be invested at the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) or in Treasury
bills. Because the lease rates charged by the central banks were less than the LIBOR rate,
if the gold spot price did not move significantly then, on average, this was a profitable trad-
ing strategy; the leasing institution essentially being able to earn the Gold Forward Offered
(GOFO) rate. This rate is the rate at which a dealer is prepared to lend gold on a swap
against U.S. dollars. However, since late 2001, the profitability of the short-maturity carry
trade has diminished. Rising gold prices have increased risk and diminished the trade’s
1See “textitBullish on Bullion” by Peter Madigan, Risk, February 1, 2008.
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profitability as a result of increasing repayment costs2. Consequently, the prevalence of the
gold carry trade is predicated on two factors; the rate at which the central bank is willing
to swap or lease gold and whether or not the gold price is increasing.
To gain insight into this aspect of the gold market, we will consider how a central bank
can proactively use gold to enhance the yield on their bullion inventories. A central bank
can lease gold to the market using two methods. The first is by simply leasing bullion to
another institution. The second method is essentially a swap whereby gold is exchanged
for U.S. dollars. The leasing of gold by central banks is relatively straightforward as a
transaction. The rate at which gold is leased is derived from the difference between the
LIBOR and GOFO rates and is given by Equation (3.1):
푙푒푎푠푒 = 퐿퐼퐵푂푅−퐺푂퐹푂 (3.1)
This is considered a derived rate since it is not set independently, but rather it arises from
the difference between the market quoted LIBOR and GOFO rates. A leasing transaction
would involve a central bank transferring ownership of the gold to the leasing institution.
The leasing institution could then sell the gold on the spot market and invest the proceeds
at, say, the LIBOR rate or could use the physical bullion to assist with producer hedging.
The central bank would charge the borrower the lease rate, as given by Equation (3.1),
for the duration of the loan. At a later date, the leasing institution, or borrower, would
buy back or simply return the gold and pay the central bank the original loan plus the
lease rate as interest. Because lease rates are less than the LIBOR rate, and if the price of
gold remains favourable, the leasing bank is able to generate a profit using this transaction
while the central bank earns the difference between the LIBOR and GOFO on its idle gold
inventories.
The second type of transaction involves a swap, but it is actually less a swap than it
is a sale and repurchase agreement. In a gold swap, a central bank is willing to exchange
2The gold carry trade is profitable when gold prices are either stable or decreasing.
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its gold bullion for cash. As with the leasing transaction, the ownership title of the gold
is transferred to the leasing institution through an actual sale, but with the added condi-
tion that the central bank agrees to repurchase the gold from the borrower at some forward
date. In selling the gold to the borrower, the central bank receives U.S. dollars and, conse-
quently, in addition to agreeing to a repurchase, the central bank also pays interest to the
leasing institution at the GOFO rate. The GOFO is thus the interest rate charged on a loan
denominated in dollars and using gold as collateral. Once in their possession, the borrower
is free to sell the gold on the spot market and invest the proceeds as before or to simply hold
the bullion and earn the secure GOFO rate. It makes sense, therefore, to think of the GOFO
rate as the rate at which the spot price rises relative to the futures price. Consequently, the
lease rate can be thought of as a proxy for the convenience yield. For example, Figure (3.1)
shows a plot of the lease rate and the negative interest-adjusted basis, as calculated using
the definition published in Fama and French (1988), for the 3, 6 and 12 month maturities.
During a gold swap, the central bank pays GOFO to the borrower. Since the GOFO rate is
less than the LIBOR, the advantage for the central bank is that it exchanged gold for cash
reserves that can be invested at a rate that exceeds the GOFO. The difference between the
investment at LIBOR and the payment of GOFO is the lease rate. Once again, the central
bank is able to generate a return from its idle bullion inventories.
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Unlike the derived lease rate, the GOFO rate is the mean of a series of rates offered
by the market making members of the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA). As
a result, the market making members can, to some extent, adjust the GOFO up or down
depending on market conditions. Thus, we can think of the GOFO rate as an observable
signal from the participating banks. When the GOFO rates are set such that there is a high
differential with the LIBOR, the market makers are interested in exchanging bullion for
U.S. dollars, a clear signal that banks are interested in obtaining cash using gold as collat-
eral. This usually occurs under conditions of high demand for bullion. When the GOFO
rate is set close to the LIBOR, neither strategy explained previously is highly profitable and
consequently, the banks signal a willingness to contribute liquidity. This situation occurs
under low demand for gold. This is because, despite the technical details behind the two
agreements, they each earn the same return. Thus, when the GOFO rate approaches the
LIBOR rate, it is a signal of low demand for physical gold; the carry trade is no longer
expected to be profitable as a result of diminished lease rates and an increasing gold price.
This situation can also occur when the gold price is high and/or rising. In light of this we
can think of the lease rate as a proxy for aggregate demand for gold liquidity, more specifi-
cally, as the convenience yield of gold. Subsequently, the GOFO rate is the theoretical rate
at which the price of a futures contract increases.
Chapter 4
Data and Summary Statistics
Our inventory data consists of daily observations of gold bullion inventories held by the
COMEX market making members and is recorded in troy ounces. These aggregated in-
ventory data are subdivided into two categories: registered stocks and eligible stocks. The
“registered” designation implies that the bullion is eligible for delivery against a futures
contract. Conversely, the “eligible” designation refers to bullion inventories kept in the
warehouse but not yet certified for delivery. In general, these inventory levels are not nec-
essarily indicative of underlying supply and demand conditions. This is because the major
depository institutions1 choose independently when to deposit their stocks. Additionally,
other bullion warehouses exist for which COMEX does not possess inventory statistics.
These observations span the period from the beginning of January 1996 until the end of
October 2009 and were used to construct a weekly series of de-trended and studentized
inventory levels similar to the procedure described in Dincerler et al. (2005). Initially,
we created an inventory innovation series using an ARIMA(0,1,0) model and then studen-
tized the resulting series of innovations. This procedure resulted in a series of discretionary
inventories, as described by Routledge et al. (2000). The value of using discretionary in-
ventory levels lies with the observation that this measure of inventory is indicative of the
1These include Brink’s Inc., Scotia Mocatta, HSBC Bank, USA and Manfra, Tordella & Brookes, Inc.
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Statistic Series
Inventory Spec. Press. Hedge Press. Small Press.
Mean 0.0000 0.1107 -0.2255 0.3254
Std. dev. 1.0000 0.3738 0.3222 0.2152
Skewness 0.2038 -0.6349 0.5657 -0.3358
Excess kurtosis 7.0800 -1.0270 -1.0830 -1.2130
Min -6.8030 -0.6576 -0.6822 -0.0963
Median -0.0951 0.2525 -0.3456 0.3818
Max 5.0450 0.6764 0.4919 0.6946
No. Obs. 712 712 712 712
Table 4.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR MARKET PRESSURE VARIABLES
The table presents summary statistics for the discretionary inventory level along with speculative, hedging and
small trader pressures for the years 1996-2009. Discretionary inventory is recorded weekly and on Wednes-
days using the average of the previous week as the Wednesday observation. Using an ARIMA(0,1,0) model,
we remove the stochastic trend to obtain a series of innovations. These are then studentized to construct
the discretionary inventory series as described in Dincerler et al. (2005). The market pressures series are
recorded with weekly frequency on the Tuesday of every week. Speculative pressure is the most volatile of
all pressures series, while small trader pressure is the most consistent, suggesting substantial differences in
the positions of the respective trader categories.
balance between the current and future consumption value of the commodity. The level of
discretionary inventory is therefore closely associated with the concept of a convenience
yield.
Our open interest data consists of weekly open interest values for commercial, non-
commercial and small trader positions collected from the CFTC Commitment of Traders
reports. The data span the period from January 1996 until October 2009 and consist of
a total of 712 weekly observations. Table 4.1 shows summary statistics for the market
pressures and discretionary inventory over the entire time period.
From Table 4.1 we can see that speculative pressure has maintained a mean positive
value over the sample period with a sample mean of 0.1107. The standard deviation of
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0.3738 is the highest of all pressures series suggesting that speculative pressure is consid-
erably volatile in comparison to the other pressures. The skewness is highly negative at
-0.6349 suggesting that, despite the high mean value, many of the observations are consid-
erably less than the mean.
The hedging pressure statistics show that, contrary to the traditional view of the gold
market as a hedging market, historical hedging pressure has maintained a negative value
with the exception being the period from mid 1996 until 2001. This suggests that the
market has been net short on average, although the result is more pronounced for more
recent years.
Small traders are those agents who do not meet the minimum reporting levels enforced
by the CFTC and are traditionally identified as small-scale speculators. From the increasing
trend in the small trader pressure, it is clear that these agents are playing an increasing
role in the gold futures market. Small trader pressure exhibits clear evidence of long-term
positivity and has the smallest standard deviation of all the pressure series suggesting small
traders are the most consistent in their positions over the sample period. The mean and
median values are similar in magnitude, highlighting this regularity. For all pressures, and
in particular the speculative pressure, the difference between the maximum and minimum
values is quite large, being indicative of large swings in trader behaviour. Overall, small
traders seem to be the most consistent in their use of the gold futures market as small trader
pressure has remained preferentially positive over the sample period.
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Statistic Unit Root Tests
Inventory Spec. Press. Hedge Press. Small Press.
ADF Test -5.52 -1.76 -1.61 -1.65
5% Crit. Val -2.86 -2.86 -2.86 -2.86
KPSS Test 0.527 2.59 2.67 2.01
5% Crit. Val 0.463 0.463 0.463 0.463
Table 4.2: RESULTS OF AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER (ADF) UNIT ROOT
TESTS ON INVENTORY AND MARKET PRESSURES
The table shows the augmented Dickey-Fuller and KPSS test statistic values for all market pressures and
discretionary inventory over the time period from 1986 to 2009. The test regression was specified to contain
a constant but no deterministic trend. As indicated by the test results, the null hypothesis of the presence of
a unit root cannot be rejected for all pressures considered. We therefore conclude that the series are unit root
non-stationary. For the discretionary inventory series, the ADF statistic rejects the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity. However, the KPSS test results suggests rejection of the null hypothesis of stationarity, albeit
weakly, for the inventory series.
Figure (4.1) shows the percent of total open interest for commercial, non-commercial
and small trader positions. There are some clear trends present in the data. The reporting
commercial and non-reporting positions show evidence of downward trends. Conversely, as
a percentage of total open interest, it is clear that the non-commercial traders are increasing
over time. If we take the traditional interpretation of non-commercial traders being identi-
fied as speculators, we see that speculators are playing a significant and increasing role in
the gold futures market.
We next tested the selected series for unit root non-stationarity using the augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and KPSS tests. Since some of the pressure series display evidence
of a significant mean value, where appropriate we specified the tests to include a constant.
Table (4.2) shows the results of our ADF unit root tests on selected time-series.
Looking at the ADF test statistics and their associated critical values, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis of unit root non-stationarity for all of our pressures time series. The
KPSS test confirms the findings of the ADF test. However, for discretionary inventory
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series, the ADF test rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5% significance level.
Conversely, the results of the KPSS test on the inventory provides a conflicting result, sug-
gesting that this series may possess a unit root, although the critical value is not exceeded
by a large margin.
From daily observations of the gold futures price, we compiled a weekly series of fu-
tures prices for the first, third, sixth and twelfth nearby gold futures contracts traded on
COMEX that resulted in a series for which prices are observed every Tuesday. In order to
construct a continuous returns series, we used the method outlined in de Roon et al. (2000).
This series of Tuesday prices corresponds to the dates on which the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) releases their weekly Commitment of Traders (CoT) report
containing the levels of market open interest. Summary statistics for the returns series are
provided in Table (4.3). Interestingly, with the exception of the 12 month contract returns,
the mean value of all returns series is 0.0014. Standard deviation values are consistent
across all contracts while skewness tends to decrease and excess kurtosis decreases across
the 3 to 12 month series.
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Statistic Returns Series
First Third Sixth Twelfth
Mean 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0010
Std. dev. 0.0239 0.0239 0.0239 0.0237
Skewness 0.5360 0.5442 0.5296 0.4831
Excess kurtosis 5.758 6.006 5.887 5.591
Min -0.1131 -0.1132 -0.1134 -0.1139
Median 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0008
Max 0.1667 0.1689 0.1665 0.1577
No. Obs. 711 711 711 711
Table 4.3: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE FUTURES RETURNS SERIES
OVER THE PERIOD FROM 1996 - 2009
The table shows the summary statistics for the first, third, sixth and twelfth nearby futures contracts for the
COMEX gold contract. Observations are weekly in frequency and have been made into a continuous returns
series using the method of de Roon et al. (2000).
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The data on the LIBOR, GOFO and lease rates span the period from January 2, 1996
until October 20, 2009. They are observed weekly, resulting in a total of 712 observations.
Table 4.4 shows summary statistics for the LIBOR, GOFO and derived lease rates across
all maturities.
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Panel A: LIBOR Rate
First Third Sixth Twelfth
Mean 3.8539 3.9574 4.0588 4.224
Std. dev. 1.9567 1.9170 1.8679 1.812
Skewness -0.399 -0.3731 -0.3450 -0.2827
Excess kurtosis -1.352 -1.385 -1.383 -1.327
Min 0.2425 0.2831 0.5856 1.019
Median 4.8637 4.9216 4.9194 4.862
Max 6.7688 6.8400 7.0625 7.450
No. Obs. 712 712 712 712
Panel B: GOFO Rate
First Third Sixth Twelfth
Mean 3.165 3.1568 3.131 3.1166
Std. dev. 1.703 1.6652 1.631 1.5658
Skewness -0.0784 -0.071 -0.0724 -0.1028
Excess kurtosis -1.298 -0.071 -1.298 -1.265
Min 0.034 0.1833 0.400 0.5829
Median 3.272 3.3508 3.395 3.4850
Max 6.160 6.1000 6.100 6.0900
No. Obs. 712 712 712 712
Panel C: Lease Rate
First Third Sixth Twelfth
Mean 0.6890 0.8005 0.9277 1.1079
Std. dev. 0.8703 0.8633 0.8565 0.8687
Skewness 1.776 1.544 1.309 0.7518
Excess kurtosis 3.175 2.792 2.24 0.5062
Min -0.2113 -0.1544 0.0611 0.0284
Median 0.2366 0.3890 0.6661 0.9703
Max 4.8125 5.5600 5.3463 5.2013
No. Obs. 712 712 712 712
Table 4.4: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE MARKET RATES (LIBOR, GOFO,
LEASE) FOR THE PERIOD 1996 - 2009
The table shows summary statistics for the LIBOR, GOFO and derived lease rates for tenors of 1, 3, 6 and
12 years for the period spanning 1996 - 2009. The LIBOR and lease rates exhibit increasing mean value
with increasing tenor. The exception is the GOFO rate, which demonstrates a decreasing mean value with
increasing tenor. The LIBOR series have the highest standard deviations, followed by the GOFO rate series
and the derived lease rate series exhibit the smallest values of standard deviation for all series. Significant
differences between minimum and maximum values can be observed for all rate series.
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The individual rates are subdivided into tenors of one, three, six and twelve months.
These data are quoted daily but in order to analyze these in conjunction with the open
interest data, we reduced the data set to weekly observation frequency, with the observa-
tion day being every Tuesday in accordance with the CoT report observations. The mean
LIBOR rate increases with maturity along with displaying decreasing excess kurtosis. Con-
versely, the mean GOFO rate decreases with maturity and, similar to the LIBOR statistics,
the GOFO rate exhibits declining leptokurticity with increasing tenor. The derived lease
rates have mean values that increase with maturity, but remain relatively small being, on
average, slightly less than or equal to 1%. The lease rate excess kurtosis decreases rapidly
from 3.175 for the 1 month rate to 0.506 for the 12 month lease rate suggesting that as the
lease rate increases, the rate changes frequently, but moderately.
Figure 4.2 shows a plot of the 1, 3, 6 and 12 month tenor term strucutre of the LIBOR,
GOFO and resulting derived lease rate for the period spanning 1996 until 2009.
32
L
ib
o
r 
T
e
r
m
 S
tr
u
c
tu
re
Y
e
a
r
Rate (in %)
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
048
G
o
fo
 T
e
r
m
 S
tr
u
c
tu
re
Y
e
a
r
Rate (in %)
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
048
L
e
a
s
e
 R
a
te
 T
e
r
m
 S
tr
u
c
tu
re
Y
e
a
r
Rate (in %)
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
048
Fi
gu
re
4.
2:
T
E
R
M
ST
R
U
C
T
U
R
E
O
F
T
H
E
L
IB
O
R
,G
O
FO
A
N
D
D
E
R
IV
E
D
L
E
A
SE
R
AT
E
S
FO
R
T
H
E
Y
E
A
R
S
19
96
-2
00
9
T
he
fig
ur
e
sh
ow
s
th
e
L
IB
O
R
,
G
O
FO
an
d
co
rr
es
po
nd
in
g
de
riv
ed
le
as
e
ra
te
fo
r
te
no
rs
of
1,
3,
6
an
d
12
m
on
th
s.
T
he
le
as
e
ra
te
is
ob
ta
in
ed
by
su
bt
ra
ct
in
g
th
e
G
O
FO
ra
te
fr
om
th
e
pr
ev
ai
lin
g
L
IB
O
R
ra
te
.
T
he
le
as
e
ra
te
is
th
e
ra
te
at
w
hi
ch
a
ce
nt
ra
lb
an
k
w
ill
le
nd
go
ld
,w
hi
le
th
e
G
O
FO
ra
te
re
pr
es
en
ts
th
e
ra
te
a
ce
nt
ra
lb
an
k
is
w
ill
in
g
to
pa
y
on
a
lo
an
se
cu
re
d
us
in
g
go
ld
as
co
lla
te
ra
l.
33
We can see from Figure 4.2 the clear relationship between the GOFO and the LIBOR
rate that gives rise to the derived lease rates. When the difference between the LIBOR and
GOFO is large, the derived lease rates are high. Conversely, when there is little difference
between the LIBOR and GOFO, derived lease rates are exceedingly low.
The relation between LIBOR and GOFO suggests that the two series may be cointe-
grated and therefore exhibit a long-term relationship. Consequently we test series of paired
LIBOR and GOFO tenors for cointegration using the Phillips and Ouliaris procedure since
the Johansen method can produce errant results for a bivariate specification. Specifically,
the finite sample specification of the Johansen maximum likelihood estimator results in the
tails of the finite sample distribution being leptokurtic, thereby resulting in extreme values
of the cointegration vector.
Table 4.5 shows the results of the Phillips-Ouliaris test for time series cointegration for
the four different LIBOR and GOFO tenors.
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1 Month Tenor
Test Description Test Statistic 5% Critical Val.
Phillips-Ouliaris 88.15 40.82
3 Month Tenor
Test Description Test Statistic 5% Critical Val.
Phillips-Ouliaris 59.94 40.82
6 Month Tenor
Test Description Test Statistic 5% Critical Val.
Phillips-Ouliaris 43.16 40.82
12 Month Tenor
Test Description Test Statistic 5% Critical Val.
Phillips-Ouliaris 29.74 40.82
Table 4.5: COINTEGRATION TEST RESULTS FOR LIBOR AND GOFO RATES
OF 1, 3, 6 AND 12 MONTH TENOR
The table shows the results of the Phillips-Ouliaris test for cointegration between the bivariate LIBOR and
GOFO time series. There is evidence for a cointegrating relationship if the value of the test statistic exceeds
the critical value at the 5% level of significance. For 1, 3 and 6 month tenors we cannot reject the hypothesis
that the LIBOR and GOFO rates are cointegrated. The results for the 12 month rates suggest that at this
maturity duration, the LIBOR and GOFO rates are not cointegrated.
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The results of the Phillips-Ouliaris cointegration test suggest that for the 1, 3 and 6
month tenors, we are able to reject the null hypothesis that the LIBOR and GOFO series
are not cointegrated. However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis for the 12 month
tenor. This suggests that there is a long-run relationship for the 1, 3 and 6 month GOFO
and LIBOR series (i.e. they are cointegrated), but we must reject the notion of a long-
term relation for the 12 month GOFO and LIBOR series. The lack of a cointegrating
relationship between the 12 month series suggests that there may be a degree of mispricing
for long term gold futures and forward contracts. It may also suggest that there are periodic
occasions during which the co-movement of the LIBOR and GOFO series breaks down.
To investigate this, we specify and estimate a multivariate GARCH model for the four
individual tenor series.
Using the Engle and Kroner (1995) BEKK model, we use a BEKK(1,1) specification
to estimate the dynamic conditional correlation between the GOFO and LIBOR series for
all available tenors. The resulting conditional correlation series are plotted in Figure 4.3.
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The correlation between the two series is often strong and very close to unity. How-
ever, from the figure, sharp opposite movements between the LIBOR and GOFO rates are
immediately evident. In total, there are approximately seven prominent breakdowns in the
correlation structure. Some of these can be identified with strong movements in the derived
lease rate, suggesting that high lease rates arise from strong opposite swings between the
LIBOR and GOFO rates. This is fully consistent with the LIBOR/GOFO relationship as
specified by Equation (2). Since a high lease rate represents a market condition consistent
with high demand for physical gold, the correlation structure suggests that the swings in
the dynamic conditional correlation may result from periods of high demand for bullion
by gold producers or, in more recent years, exchange traded funds (ETFs). It may also be
suggestive of a preference for bullion vs. dollars or vice versa. Because the GOFO rate
is set by the market making members of the gold market, these swings are a direct result
of the policies of the respective contributing members. Historically, these members have
included such banks as J.P. Morgan, Scotia Bank and HSBC, among others.
Chapter 5
Inventory Effects
5.1 Does the GOFO Rate Affect Inventory Levels?
In Figure (5.1) we have plotted the three, six and twelve month GOFO rates versus the level
of discretionary gold stocks. To facilitate comparison over the various tenors, we used an
ARIMA(0,1,0) model in order to remove linear trends from both the GOFO and interest-
adjusted basis series. The scatter plots of Figure (5.1) show a relatively loose distribution
of points, with some concentration about the zero discretionary inventory level, suggest-
ing a weak connection between GOFO rate and the level of gold discretionary inventories.
Notably, the dispersion of the points increases considerably with increasing maturity, sug-
gesting a larger range between maximum and minimum rates, increasing volatility, and a
decreasing statistical relationship with inventory level particularly for the longer tenors.
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To visualize the relationship between the GOFO rate and the level of discretionary
inventory, we fitted a second order polynomial to the data using the regression in Equation
(5.1):
퐺푂퐹푂 (푖)푡 = 훼 + 훽1퐼푛푣푡 + 훽2퐼푛푣
2
푡 + 휀푡 (5.1)
where 퐺푂퐹푂 (푖)푡 represents the GOFO rate for the 푖
푡ℎ month tenor, 퐼푛푣푡 is the level of
discretionary inventory at time 푡 and 퐼푛푣2푡 is the squared level of discretionary inventory
also at time 푡. The latter term is present in order to capture any non-linear effects in in-
ventory. The first row of Figure (5.1) shows second order polynomial to the 1 and 3 month
GOFO tenors, while the second row shows the corresponding second order fits for the 6
and 12 month tenors. The black line is a second-order polynomial fit to the data as calcu-
lated using Equation (5.1). We can see that the fitted lines are all concave up and slightly
asymmetric about the zero level of discretionary inventory. Furthermore, they exhibit a
more pronounced concavity and asymmetry for increased GOFO tenor. That is, GOFO
rates appear typically higher when discretionary inventories are net negative and slightly
lower when discretionary inventories are net positive, suggesting the possibility that higher
GOFO rates may be associated with lower inventory levels.
We have argued that the GOFO rate is related to the percentage increase in the gold
future price, specifically the theoretical gold forward price should rise at the GOFO rate.
To assess the effect of the level of inventory on the GOFO rate, and therefore the change in
the gold futures price, we follow Dincerler et al. (2005) and use a regression of the form:
퐺푂퐹푂 (푖)푡 = 훽1퐼푛푣푡 + 훽2퐼푛푣
2
푡 + 휀푡 (5.2)
where 퐺푂퐹푂 (푖)푡 represents the 푖
푡ℎ month GOFO tenor series, and 퐼푛푣푡 and 퐼푛푣2푡 are the
inventory and inventory level squared, respectively. From an econometric perspective, the
GOFO rate possesses a high degree of autocorrelation. Indeed, an ADF test on the 3 month
GOFO series gives a test statistic of -1.825 compared to the 1% critical value of -3.43,
indicating we cannot reject the hypothesis of unit root non-stationarity. This is weakly
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GOFO Moving Block Bootstrap Results
First Third Sixth Twelfth
Panel A: Coefficient of 퐼푛푣푡
Original -0.0082 -0.0243 -0.0493 -0.0891
Bias -0.0008 -0.0015 -0.0047 -0.0096
Std. Error 0.0073 0.0203 0.0412 0.0767
95% C.I. (-0.0251, 0.0040) (-0.0709, 0.0102) (-0.1378, 0.0171) (-0.2613, 0.0359)
Panel B: Coefficient of 퐼푛푣2푡
Original 0.0002 0.0006 0.0024 0.0064
Bias 0.0002 0.0010 0.0021 0.0051
Std. Error 0.0029 0.0083 0.0169 0.0352
95% C.I. (-0.0047, 0.0073) (-0.0122, 0.0216) (-0.0241, 0.0434) (-0.0441, 0.0968)
Table 5.1: RESULTS OF THE MOVING BLOCK BOOTSTRAP OF THE GOFO
RATE ON LEVEL OF DISCRETIONARY INVENTORY AND LEVEL OF DIS-
CRETIONARY INVENTORY SQUARED
Displayed are the nonparametric moving block bootstrap results for the regression model specified as
퐺푂퐹푂 (푖)푡 = 훽1퐼푛푣푡 + 훽2퐼푛푣
2
푡 + 휀푡. Despite the suggestions of the second-order polynomial fits, the
results of the bootstrapping suggest that there is no significant relationship between the GOFO rate and either
the level of discretionary inventory or the squared discretionary inventory level. The results indicate there
are neither level nor non-linear inventory effects on the GOFO rate. Furthermore, these results are consistent
across all tenors.
supported by a KPSS test for stationarity that yields a test statistic of 0.441 compared to
a critical value of 0.463 at the 5% level1. One consequence of unit root non-stationarity
is that the standard errors of a least squares regression will be underestimated while the
t-statistics will be overestimated. This can lead to erroneous results regarding the statistical
significance of the regression coefficients, and thus we employ the moving block bootstrap
(MBB) with a block length of 푙 = 16 so that consecutively sampled data blocks will not be
correlated.
The bootstrapping results for Equation (5.2) are given in Table (5.1) where we provide
the results the observed GOFO tenors.
1Similar conclusions are obtained for all maturities.
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In analyzing the GOFO rate bootstrapping, we find no statistically significant relation-
ship between the level of inventory or inventory squared and the gold forward offered rate,
despite the suggestions of the second order polynomial fits. The coefficients on inventory
are small and negative and the confidence intervals suggest that the coefficients may be
equivalent to zero. For the level of inventory squared, the coefficients are positive across
all maturities, but remain statistically insignificant, showing no indication of non-linear in-
ventory dependence. We conclude that inventory levels do not influence the GOFO rate
setting and thus the gold forward rate, is not inventory-level dependent. This is also con-
sistent with an interpretation that links the GOFO rate to a preference for dollars in relation
to bullion. We conclude that the level of discretionary inventory does not affect the futures
price of gold, which is in keeping with the large levels of above ground gold inventories
that greatly exceed annual levels of gold mine production.
5.2 Changes in GOFO and Changes in Inventory
Figure (5.1) suggests that discretionary inventory changes with the GOFO rate. However,
we cannot establish a direct relationship between the GOFO rate and the level of inventory
since the various GOFO tenor time series display evidence of unit root nonstationarity.
Table (5.2) shows the numerical results of three different tests for unit roots in the various
GOFO rate tenors.
The ADF test column shows the calculated test statistic and the associated 5% critical
value for the null hypothesis of a unit root in parentheses. Across all tenors the critical value
is less than the value of the test statistic and we are unable to reject the presence of a unit
root. To confirm these findings we perform two additional tests, the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (KPSS), and the Phillips-Perron (PP) test. The PP test shares the same null
hypothesis of the ADF test and shown in brackets are the 푝-values of the test. These values
suggest that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity. Finally, the KPSS
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GOFO tenor ADF Test KPSS Test PP Test
1M GOFO -1.867 0.5054 -8.615
(-2.86) (0.463) (0.6216)
3M GOFO -1.825 0.4406 -7.024
(-2.86) (0.463) (0.7915)
6M GOFO -1.841 0.3909 -6.293
(-2.86) (0.463) (0.899)
12M GOFO -1.644 0.3538 -5.627
(-2.86) (0.463) (0.9162)
Table 5.2: RESULTS OF UNIT ROOT TESTS ON 1, 3, 6 AND 12 MONTH GOFO
TENORS
The table shows the results of testing the 1, 3, 6 and 12 month tenor GOFO rate time series. We used three
separate unit root tests: the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS),
and the Phillips-Perron (PP) test. The ADF and PP tests examine the null hypothesis that the series being
tested has a unit root (against the alternative of stationarity). The KPSS test evaluates the null hypothesis
that the series is level or trend stationary. The table provides the value of the test statistic and the associated
5% critical values in the case of the ADF and KPSS tests. The PP test shows the ADF regression coefficient
along with the 푝-value of the test.
test examines the null hypothesis that the series being tested is level or trend stationary.
For the 1 month tenor the test statistic exceeds the 5% critical value given in parentheses
while the higher tenors exhibit an increasingly weak rejection of the null hypothesis. Taken
together, the results of all three tests indicate that the four GOFO time series are all unit
root nonstationary.
To transform the nonstationary GOFO series to stationary series, we take a first dif-
ferences approach. In differencing the four GOFO tenor series, the resulting series are
stationary. Subsequently, we can regress the change in the GOFO rate on the contempora-
neous change in the level of discretionary inventory. Because the price of gold rises at the
GOFO rate, a regression of this specification effectively allows us to establish a relationship
between the driving factor of the gold price and inventory withdrawals. The expectation
is that a positive change in the GOFO rate will be accompanied by a negative inventory
withdrawal, indicative of a decrease in inventory levels resulting in an increase in the gold
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price. However, given the large magnitude of bullion inventories, the relationship may not
be statistically significant.
Δ퐺푂퐹푂푡 (푖) = 훼 + 훽1Δ퐼푛푣푡 + 훽2Δ퐼푛푣
2
푡 + 휀푡 (5.3)
We have included a second-order term of the change in level of discretionary inventory in
Equation (5.3) in order to capture any nonlinear effects of inventory on the change in the
GOFO rate. Due to residual autocorrelation in the differenced GOFO series, we estimate
Equation (5.3) using a maximum likelihood GLS procedure. The process 휀푡 is assumed to
be a second-order ARMA(푝, 푞) process with 푝 = 2. Under this specification, the resulting
regression residuals contain no residual serial correlation.
Table (5.3) contains the maximum likelihood coefficient estimates for the regression
model given in Equation (5.3). For all four tenors, we check the residuals for autocorrela-
tion using a portmanteau Box-Ljung test with a null hypothesis of serial independence. The
Box-Ljung statistics for the 1, 3, 6 and 12 month residual series are 17.15, 16.18, 16.43,
and 7.359 with 푝-values of 0.144, 0.183, 0.172, and 0.833, respectively. Consequently, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the residuals are not serially correlated. Therefore, the
coefficient estimates suggest that for all tenors, the GOFO series remains unaffected by
inventory level and withdrawals.
5.3 Inventory, Convenience Yield and the Lease Rate
When a central bank engages in a gold leasing transaction there is a transfer of title that
occurs, the ownership of the bullion being transferred to the leasing institution for the
duration of the lease. In this transaction, the central bank earns the difference between the
prevailing LIBOR and current GOFO rate; in other words, they earn the derived lease rate
on the transaction. As a result, the lease rate is an observable form of the convenience yield,
traditionally proxied by the interest-adjusted basis. According to Fama and French (1988)
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Coefficient Estimate Std. Err. 푡-ratio 푝-value
1M GOFO Tenor
훼 -0.0039 0.0097 -0.41 0.68
훽1 -0.0066 0.0088 -0.74 0.46
훽2 0.0017 0.0030 0.56 0.57
3M GOFO Tenor
훼 -0.0039 0.0082 -0.47 0.64
훽1 -0.0065 0.0068 -0.95 0.34
훽2 0.0013 0.0024 0.53 0.59
6M GOFO Tenor
훼 -0.0038 0.0074 -0.51 0.61
훽1 -0.0085 0.0058 -1.47 0.14
훽2 0.0020 0.0020 1.00 0.32
12M GOFO Tenor
훼 -0.0035 0.0071 -0.49 0.63
훽1 -0.0073 0.0053 -1.38 0.17
훽2 0.0016 0.0019 0.87 0.38
Table 5.3: COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR THE REGRESSION OF CHANGE IN
GOFO ON INVENTORY WITHDRAWALS
The table presents the coefficient estimates of a GLS regression estimated using maximum likelihood for
the model Δ퐺푂퐹푂푡 (푖) = 훼 + 훽1Δ퐼푛푣푡 + 훽2Δ퐼푛푣2푡 + 휀푡. The results in the table show that there is
no coefficient on inventory withdrawals that is statistically significant at the <5% level. The coefficient for
inventory withdrawals squared is not significant at the 5% across all tenors.
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the interest-adjusted basis can be written as:
퐼퐴퐵 (푡) =
퐹 (푡, 푇 )− 푆 (푡)
푆 (푡)
−푅 (푡, 푇 ) = 푤 (푡, 푇 )− 푐 (푡, 푇 ) (5.4)
where 퐹 (푡, 푇 ) is the futures price, 푆 (푡) is the spot price at time 푡, 푅 (푡, 푇 ) is the interest
rate over the period from 푡 to 푇 , and 푤 (푡, 푇 ) and 푐 (푡, 푇 ) are the relative warehousing cost
and relative convenience yield, respectively.
Since a central bank can earn the lease rate simply by holding physical gold, the lease
rate can be thought of as the convenience yield. Therefore, the price of gold must rise at a
rate that equals the difference between the LIBOR and lease rates; in other words it must
rise at the GOFO rate. Equation (5.4) can therefore be rewritten as:
퐼퐴퐵 (푡) = 퐺푂퐹푂 (푡, 푇 )− 퐿퐼퐵푂푅 (푡, 푇 ) = 푤 (푡, 푇 )− 푐 (푡, 푇 ) (5.5)
where we have replaced 푅 (푡, 푇 ) with 퐿퐼퐵푂푅 (푡, 푇 ). In accordance with equation (3.1),
equation (5.5) is equivalent to the negative derived lease rate. Rearrangement of equation
(5.5) subsequently gives:
푙푒푎푠푒 = −퐼퐴퐵 (푡) = 푐 (푡, 푇 )− 푤 (푡, 푇 ) (5.6)
It can be seen from equation (5.6), then, that the lease rate serves as a proxy for the relative
convenience yield, particularly in the limit when 푤 (푡, 푇 ) approaches zero. We therefore
expect to find a relationship between the lease rate and the level of inventory. In order
for the lease rate to remain small, 푤 (푡, 푇 ) must be of the same magnitude as 푐 (푡, 푇 ). A
high lease rate or, equivalently, a high convenience yield under low storage costs, implies
high demand for physical gold and thus should have a negative coefficient in a regression
of inventory level on the lease rate. Additionally, we should expect that the influence of
the lease rate on inventory levels decreases with the increasing maturity of the lease. This
is because short-term leasing will have a more immediate effect on inventory levels than
long-term leases. Figure (5.2) shows the relationship between the lease rate and the level
of discretionary inventory.
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In a similar manner to the GOFO rate, we observe an asymmetric response of conve-
nience yield to positive and negative levels of discretionary inventory, but with one im-
portant difference. When the level of discretionary inventory is positive, the derived lease
rate tends towards zero as would be expected of the convenience yield. Conversely, for
the GOFO rate we observed a concave upwards fitted curve, suggesting that for positive
inventory levels, the GOFO rate does not decline towards zero, but rather increases with
increasing levels of inventory after exhibiting a local minimum when the level of discre-
tionary inventory is close to zero.
To examine this relationship between the lease rate and the discretionary inventory, we
use the linear regression model specified in Equation (5.7):
퐼푛푣푡 = 훽1퐿푒푎푠푒 (푖)푡−1 + 훽2퐼푛푣푡−1 + 휀푡 (5.7)
where 퐿푒푎푠푒 (푖)푡−1 is the prevailing 푖
푡ℎ month lease rate in the previous time period, and
퐼푛푣푡−1 is the level of discretionary inventory at time 푡 − 1. The lagged inventory term is
present in order to capture any residual autocorrelation. The results of the regression are
given in Table (5.4).
We can see that across all lease maturities, the coefficient, 훽1, is negative. However,
it is only highly significant for lease rates of one, three and six month maturities. For the
twelve month rate, the coefficient is only weakly significant at the 10% level and is less than
half the value of the 6 month coefficient. The magnitude and statistical significance of the
coefficient diminishes with increasing maturity being -0.11 for the 1 month rate and -0.05
for the 12 month lease duration. This reflects the diminishing impact of leasing activity
on inventory levels as lease late tenor increases. The influence of discretionary inventory
from the previous period is consistent across all maturities and the value of the coefficient
remains close to 0.1, but is statistically insignificant. The negative lease rate coefficient
and decreasing influence with maturity suggests that short term leasing activities act to
reduce gold inventory levels. This occurs most likely because at time 푡, the bullion leased
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value p-value
1 Month Lease Rate
훽1 -0.1068 0.0379 -2.82 0.005 **
훽2 0.0916 0.0736 1.24 0.214
3 Month Lease Rate
훽1 -0.0887 0.0353 -2.51 0.012 *
훽2 0.0942 0.0745 1.26 0.207
6 Month Lease Rate
훽1 -0.0682 0.0322 -2.12 0.034 *
훽2 0.0977 0.0750 1.30 0.193
12 Month Tenor
훽1 -0.0511 0.0284 -1.80 0.072 .
훽2 0.1001 0.0747 1.34 0.181
Table 5.4: RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION OF INVENTORY LEVEL ON PAST
3 MONTH LEASE RATE AND LAGGED INVENTORY LEVEL OVER THE PE-
RIOD 1996-2009
Shown are the results of the regression 퐼푛푣푡 = 훽1퐿푒푎푠푒푡−1 + 훽2퐼푛푣푡−1 + 휀푡, which is specified in order
to investigate the effect of lagged lease rates on the level of discretionary gold inventory. The lag-1 level
of inventory was included to capture any remaining autocorrelation. Across all maturities, the coefficient of
lagged inventory remains positive, consistent but statistically insignificant suggesting there is no carry-over
inventory effect. Notably, the effect of the lagged lease rate diminishes with increasing lease rate duration.
This suggests that short-term leasing has a more pronounced effect on current inventory levels. The negative
coefficient implies that short-term lease repayments, in the form of physical bullion, act to reduce the current
inventory level.
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1
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in previous time periods must be returned either to the central bank or the institution that
leased the gold, the additional interest being charged in the form of bullion as opposed to
dollars. Consequently, high lease rates in period 푡− 1 lead to repayments at time 푡, which,
in turn, leads to a reduction in market inventories at time 푡. One plausible explanation for
the declining influence with lease maturity is that, for the borrower, short-term lease rates
tend to be lower than long-term rates and are therefore less expensive, resulting in increased
short-term leasing activity. Other factors that may be of concern when considering lease
rate durations are fluctuations in exchange rates and increases in the spot price of gold,
which can result in the lease transaction being more expensive to the borrower.
Besides bullion leasing, there is another possible factor that can affect gold inventory
levels. An increase in the number of open futures contracts may cause exchange inventory
levels to increase since a gold futures contract is an expectation of future delivery of physi-
cal gold. Therefore, as a robustness check, we test the hypothesis that speculative pressure
results in increased inventory levels and, to that effect, specify a linear regression of the
form shown in Equation (5.8):
퐼푛푣푡 = 훼+ 훽1퐿푒푎푠푒 (푖)푡−1 + 훽2퐼푛푣푡−1 + 훽3푡−1 + 휀푡 (5.8)
Here 퐼푛푣푡 is the inventory level in millions of troy ounces at time 푡, 퐿푒푎푠푒 (푖)푡−1 is the 푖
푡ℎ
month tenor derived lease rate at time 푡 − 1, and 푡−1 is the speculative pressure at time
푡 − 1 which we include in order to capture any dependence of the inventory on increasing
long trader positions. Once again, lagged inventory is included in the regression in order
to capture the significant lag-1 component of the inventory partial autocorrelation function.
The results of regression (5.8) are shown in Table (5.5).
The results in Table (5.5) show that, by including speculative pressure as an additional
variable, the effect of the lease rate on discretionary inventory level decreases substantially.
The results for the 1 month contract show that the influence of the lease rate has diminished
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value p-value
1 Month Lease Rate
훽1 -0.0650 0.0379 -1.71 0.08683 .
훽2 0.0680 0.0742 0.92 0.35997
훽3 0.4139 0.1088 3.81 0.00015 ***
3 Month Lease Rate
훽1 -0.0559 0.0354 -1.58 0.11
훽2 0.0683 0.0748 0.91 0.36
훽3 0.4283 0.1095 3.91 <0.0001 ***
6 Month Lease Rate
훽1 -0.0426 0.0326 -1.31 0.19
훽2 0.0696 0.0750 0.93 0.35
훽3 0.4416 0.1089 4.05 <0.0001 ***
12 Month Tenor
훽1 -0.0316 0.0285 -1.11 0.27
훽2 0.0705 0.0746 0.95 0.34
훽3 0.4498 0.1071 4.20 <0.0001 ***
Table 5.5: RESULTS OF THE LEASE REGRESSION INCLUDING SPECULATIVE
PRESSURE OVER THE PERIOD 1996-2009
The table shows the coefficient estimates and associated regression statistics for the regression model: 퐼푛푣푡 =
훼 + 훽1퐿푒푎푠푒 (푖)푡−1 + 훽2퐼푛푣푡−1 + 훽3푡−1 + 휀푡. By controlling for speculative pressure, we note that the
effect of the lease rate on discretionary inventory level is now very weak and significant at just under the 10%
level of significance for the 1 month rate tenor. This suggests that speculative pressure increases inventory
levels counteracting the negative effect of lease repayments.
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1
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in significance, the regression coefficient is now significant at the 10% level and has de-
creased in magnitude from a value of -0.11 to -0.07. In the case of the 1 month contract, the
relation between the lease rate and the inventory level is now considerably weaker, signif-
icance being just outside the 5% level of confidence. For the 3, 6 and 12 month contracts,
we conclude that there is no statistically significant relationship between the lease rate and
the level of inventory.
Interestingly, although the lease rate relationship has weakened, there is now a positive
and statistically significant relationship between the lagged speculative pressure and the
discretionary inventory level. Furthermore, this relationship gradually increases with lease
duration. The speculative pressure coefficient for the 1 month contract is 0.414 while that
for the 12 month contract is 0.449. The lease rate and the speculative pressure appear to
work in opposition to one another; the former acts to decrease short-term bullion inventories
via lease repayments, while the latter result suggests speculators dominate leasing activity
in the long-term. Finally, we note the continued presence of the carry-over effect such
that the value of inventory at time 푡 − 1 is positively related to inventory at time 푡. The
results for the speculative pressure coefficient suggest that, due to increased speculative
activity in long futures contracts, COMEX inventories have increased in order to cover the
open contract positions. We conclude that inventory levels are affected only by short-term
leasing activity and therefore gold convenience yields do not affect inventory equally across
maturities.
5.4 The Effect of Lease Rates on Inventory Withdrawals
It is worthwhile to investigate whether changes in the lease rate, or convenience yield,
influence the level of bullion inventory and whether or not this changes with lease duration.
While the gold lease rate is available primarily to agents and institutions participating in
the over-the-counter (OTC) market, it should remain a viable proxy for overall gold market
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liquidity demand. Consequently, when the lease rate is high it signals a period of high
demand for bullion by the market. Under this assumption, we might expect to see increased
inventory withdrawals along with increases in the derived lease rate.
Following Dincerler et al. (2005), we define withdrawals as the first-differenced series
of discretionary inventory. Although the lease rate may not strongly influence the level of
discretionary inventory, it is possible that a change in the lease rate could affect inventory
withdrawals. Accordingly, we regress inventory withdrawals on the change in the lease rate
using the regression specified in Equation (5.9).
Δ퐼푛푣푡 = 훽1Δ퐿푒푎푠푒 (푖)푡 + 훽2Δ퐼푛푣푡−1 + 휀푡 (5.9)
Table (5.6) shows the positive influence of changes in the lease rate on inventory with-
drawals.
The coefficient, 훽1, is positive for all contract maturities. However, it remains statis-
tically insignificant for all maturity contracts. This positive dependence may results from
increased lease rates increasing supply to the market with a subsequent reduction in demand
for physical bullion. Dependence on previous inventory levels is consistently negative and
highly significant and has the rather intuitive interpretation that withdrawals in period 푡− 1
serve to reduce inventory levels at time 푡. The statistical significance of the results shows
that there is a regular turnover of gold inventories in the futures market, but suggests that
the quantity of leased gold remains independent of the level of the lease rate.
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value p-value
1 Month Lease Rate
훽1 0.1068 0.1063 1.0 0.32
훽2 -0.4988 0.0504 -9.9 <0.0001 ***
3 Month Lease Rate
훽1 0.1198 0.1424 0.84 0.4
훽2 -0.4982 0.0506 -9.85 <0.0001 ***
6 Month Lease Rate
훽1 0.2265 0.1914 1.18 0.24
훽2 -0.4978 0.0507 -9.82 <0.0001 ***
12 Month Tenor
훽1 0.1901 0.2421 0.79 0.43
훽2 -0.4977 0.0509 -9.79 <0.0001 ***
Table 5.6: RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION OF WITHDRAWALS ON CHANGES
IN THE LEASE RATE OVER THE PERIOD 1996-2009
The table shows the regression output for the model: Δ퐼푛푣푡 = 훽1Δ퐿푒푎푠푒 (푖)푡 + 훽2Δ퐼푛푣푡−1 + 휀푡. This ex-
amines the effect of the lease rate on inventory withdrawals, while controlling for past inventory withdrawals.
The estimation results for the coefficient of lagged inventory withdrawals suggest that there is a consistent
level of withdrawals that acts to diminish withdrawals at time 푡. The coefficient 훽2 remains nearly constant
in value, negative and statistically significant across all lease rates. In addition, we observe that the lease rate
is a statistically insignificant factor in explaining gold stock withdrawals.
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1
Chapter 6
The Effect of Speculative Pressure on
Returns
In recent years, commodities have become popular as an investment in and of themselves
and are now present in the portfolios of investors as an asset class that provides not only
diversification but profitable returns. To that effect, it is apropos to study the factors affect-
ing commodity futures returns. We do so using a similar regression model similar to that
of de Roon et al. (2000):
푟푖,푡 = 훼 + 훽1푟푖,푡−1 + 훽2푟푆푁푃500푡 + 훽3푡 + 휀푡 (6.1)
Equation (6.1) regresses the return of the 푖푡ℎ returns series for the 1, 3, 6 and 12 month fu-
tures contracts on past returns, 푟푖,푡−1, the return on the S&P 500 market portfolio, 푟푆푁푃500푡 ,
and the speculative pressure, 푡. Least-squares coefficient estimates and their associated
standard errors are reported in Table (6.1).
For all returns series, the constant coefficient is small, positive and not statistically
significant. A similar result holds for the coefficient of lagged returns, confirming the well-
known result that past returns are not reliable predictors of current futures returns. The
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value p-value
1 Month Returns
훼 0.000426 0.000829 0.51 0.60767
훽1 0.004186 0.050199 0.08 0.93356
훽2 0.032827 0.038148 0.86 0.38980
훽3 0.008385 0.002148 3.90 0.00010 ***
3 Month Returns
훼 0.000405 0.000827 0.49 0.62
훽1 0.010812 0.049374 0.22 0.83
훽2 0.036614 0.037727 0.97 0.33
훽3 0.008421 0.002144 3.93 9.4×10−5 ***
6 Month Returns
훼 0.000393 0.000825 0.48 0.63
훽1 0.010615 0.049777 0.21 0.83
훽2 0.038689 0.037616 1.03 0.30
훽3 0.008467 0.002148 3.94 9×10−5 ***
12 Month Returns
훼 0.000365 0.000815 0.45 0.65
훽1 0.008258 0.050412 0.16 0.87
훽2 0.045925 0.037524 1.22 0.22
훽3 0.008573 0.002136 4.01 6.6×10−5 ***
Table 6.1: RESULTS FOR THE REGRESSION OF RETURNS ON SPECULATIVE
PRESSURE FOR THE YEARS 1996 - 2009
The table contains the estimation statistics of the regression model: 푟푖,푡 = 훼 + 훽1푟푖,푡−1 + 훽2푟푆푁푃500푡 +
훽3푡 + 휀푡. The results demonstrate that current returns are not related to past returns. Additionally, we
note that gold futures returns are positively, but insignificantly related to returns on the S&P 500 index.
Additionally, we note that the level of speculative pressure is positively and significantly related to futures
returns, suggesting that increased speculation leads to slightly higher returns, although the coefficient, 훽3 is
rather small in magnitude, being on the order of 0.008.
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1
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returns to the gold futures contract are positively related to the returns on the market port-
folio, but the result is not statistically significant. We note in particular that speculative
pressure exerts a positive influence on returns. For all months, the speculative pressure co-
efficient is positive and highly significant having a consistent value of approximately 0.008.
As a robustness check, we include the “price pressure” term as discussed in de Roon et al.
(2000). This takes the form of a change in speculative pressure, Δ푡, and captures any bias
in the futures contract price resulting from increased demand for contracts. Specifically,
an increase in demand for futures contracts will result in a temporary upward futures price
bias. This is the price pressure hypothesis. In order to compare the regression coefficients
on speculative pressure and price pressure, we divide each term by its respective standard
deviation. This leads to the regression model of Equation (6.2):
푟푖,푡 = 훼 + 훽1푟푖,푡−1 + 훽2푟푆푁푃500푡 + 훽3
푡
휎 ( 푡)
+ 훽4
Δ 푡
휎 (Δ 푡)
+ 휀푡 (6.2)
The associated coefficient estimates are shown in Table (6.2).
We confirm that neither the constant term nor past returns influence current returns,
which is consistent with our previous findings. However, the inclusion of the price pres-
sure term leads to a decrease in the speculative pressure coefficient estimates, nonetheless,
the speculative pressure coefficient, 훽3 remains statistically significant for all maturity re-
turns series and increases with maturity. There seems to be, therefore, a more pronounced
speculative effect for the longer maturity futures returns series, which is consistent with the
idea that speculators make bets on the long-term price of gold. Despite this, price pressure
effects dominate speculative pressure effects, the former being highly significant while the
latter exhibits exceedingly small 푝-values. Thus, for long-term returns series, there is a
conclusive speculative effect such that speculative pressure, in part, determines futures re-
turns even after controlling for both price pressure and past returns. Additionally, we note
that the price pressure coefficient, 훽4, is positive and highly significant across all returns
series suggesting that demand for futures contracts, in part, determines futures risk-premia.
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-value p-value
1 Month Returns
훼 0.000771 0.000774 1.00 0.320
훽1 -0.048322 0.051790 -0.93 0.351
훽2 0.032327 0.034208 0.95 0.345
훽3 0.002219 0.000804 2.76 0.006 **
훽4 0.009725 0.000870 11.17 <2×10−16 ***
3 Month Returns
훼 0.000750 0.000774 0.97 0.3331
훽1 -0.043383 0.051143 -0.85 0.3966
훽2 0.036005 0.033796 1.07 0.2871
훽3 0.002239 0.000804 2.78 0.0055 **
훽4 0.009756 0.000874 11.16 <2×1016***
6 Month Returns
훼 0.000736 0.000773 0.95 0.3412
훽1 -0.043567 0.051610 -0.84 0.3989
훽2 0.038082 0.033649 1.13 0.2581
훽3 0.002261 0.000805 2.81 0.0051 **
훽4 0.009715 0.000870 11.17 <2×10−16 ***
12 Month Returns
훼 0.000702 0.000764 0.92 0.358
훽1 -0.045052 0.052161 -0.86 0.388
훽2 0.045321 0.033345 1.36 0.175
훽3 0.002317 0.000802 2.89 0.004 **
훽4 0.009556 0.000857 11.15 <2×10−16 ***
Table 6.2: ROBUSTNESS CHECK FOR THE REGRESSION OF RETURNS ON
SPECULATIVE PRESSURE AND PRICE PRESSURE FOR THE YEARS 1996 -
2009
The table shows the results of a robust specification of the returns regression model given by the following
equation: 푟푖,푡 = 훼 + 훽1푟푖,푡−1 + 훽2푟푆푁푃500푡 + 훽3
푡
휎( 푡)
+ 훽4
Δ 푡
휎(Δ 푡)
+ 휀푡. In this regression, we include
both a speculative pressure term and a price pressure term, specified as the change in speculative pressure
from time 푡 − 1 to time 푡. We divide both series by their respective standard deviation in order to compare
them effectively. Results show that, after controlling for price pressure, the effect of speculative pressure on
returns is mitigated. While still significant at the 1% level, the value of the speculative pressure coefficient,
훽3, is considerably reduced. However, we note that the speculative pressure effect does remain statistically
significant at the<5% level across all returns series and increases with the maturity horizon. This is consistent
with our previous findings that speculators may be induced to speculate long term as their increased risk-
aversion for long-term bets resulting in higher futures contract risk-premiums.
Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’ 0.1
Chapter 7
Price Differences Between Forward and
Futures Contracts
7.1 Mispricing and Speculative Pressure
Prior work on the difference between forward and futures contract prices was carried out
by Park and Chen (1985) and French (1983). In their empirical analysis they found that
futures contract prices were significantly different from forward contract prices and that,
on average, futures prices exceeded forward prices. If we consider the pricing of futures
contracts on gold, which is considered an investment asset, then for a forward contract of
time to delivery, 푇 , we have:
퐹0 = 푆0푒
(푟+푢−푦)푇 (7.1)
where 푟 is the risk-free rate, 푢 is the storage cost that is proportional to the spot price and 푦
is the convenience yield. To express Equation (7.1) in terms relevant to the gold market, we
recall that a central bank has two main options to enhance the yield on their gold bullion
inventories. They can either lease the gold directly, in which case they earn the lease rate, or
they can engage in a gold swap with a suitable counter party. In the former case, the central
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bank earns the lease rate as a pure result of holding physical gold. Since this quantity is
earned by holding physical inventory rather than a paper contract, the lease rate can be
interpreted as the convenience yield of gold. The counter party to the leasing agreement
may be charged the lease rate on the bullion loan, but they can immediately sell the gold on
the spot market and invest the proceeds in a secure investment at, for example the LIBOR
rate. Thus, the borrower is able to earn the difference between the LIBOR and lease rates,
which is equivalent to GOFO.
The second strategy, a swap, allows the central bank to exchange gold for dollars. The
swap is therefore a loan of dollars, secured using gold as collateral. Under the swap agree-
ment, the central bank can invest the dollars at LIBOR while agreeing to pay the GOFO rate
to the holder of the bullion. At the end of the leasing transaction, the gold is repurchased
by the central bank. The central bank has earned the lease rate on the gold exchange and
the bullion holder has earned the GOFO rate on his loaned dollars. As we should expect,
the respective yields from the swap are equivalent to the yields earned in the normal leasing
transaction.
Given the preceding analysis and under the assumption that storage costs are equal to
zero, the price of a gold futures contract in terms of market variables can be expressed as:
푓0푒
(푙푒푎푠푒)푇 = 푆0푒
(퐿퐼퐵푂푅)푇 (7.2)
푓0 = 푆0푒
(퐺푂퐹푂)푇 (7.3)
From (7.3) we can see that the theoretical price of a gold futures contract rises at the gold
forward rate. Consequently, the observed GOFO rates serve as a measure of the degree of
contango in the gold price.
To compare the relationship between the futures price calculated using equation (7.3)
and the observed market futures prices, we define the log mispricing level between the
observed futures price and the theoretical forward price as:
푀 = log (푓푢푡푢푟푒푠)− log (푓표푟푤푎푟푑) (7.4)
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We express the mispricing in terms of natural logarithms in order to reduce heteroskedas-
ticity in the series for 푀 . This metric provides us with a measure of the difference between
gold forward and gold futures prices under both stochastic interest rates and stochastic
convenience yields. Table (7.1) shows summary statistics for the 1, 3, 6 and 12 month
forward/futures mispricing series.
The mean values of the mispricing series increase with increasing maturity from a low
mean value of -0.0009 for the one month period to a high mean value of 0.19 for the 12
month calculation. In addition, the standard deviation increases with maturity in the same
manner.
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Variable Statistic
1 Month Tenor
Mean -0.0009
Std. Dev. 0.0012
Min -0.0087
Median -0.0007
Max 0.0028
3 Month Tenor
Mean 0.0941
Std. Dev. 0.2129
Min -0.7248
Median 0.0819
Max 0.7614
6 Month Tenor
Mean 0.1294
Std. Dev. 0.2148
Min -0.6706
Median 0.1228
Max 0.8221
12 Month Tenor
Mean 0.1932
Std. Dev. 0.2268
Min -0.5912
Median 0.1917
Max 1.1103
Table 7.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE 1, 3, 6 AND 12 MONTH MISPRIC-
ING SERIES FOR THE YEARS 1996 - 2009
The table shows summary statistics for the mispricing series of the log-difference of observed futures prices
and theoretical forward contract prices. Separate statistics are given for 1, 3, 6 and 12 month contract maturi-
ties. Although the 1 month contract exhibits a small degree of under-pricing of futures relative to forwards, we
observe and increasingly positive mean in the 3, 6 and 12 month series, suggesting that, for these contracts,
futures are over-priced, on average, relative to forwards.
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Figure (7.1) depicts a plot of the four mispricing time series. We see that for the 1
month contract, the mispricing is preferentially negative, indicating that calculated forward
prices exceed observed futures prices. However, with increasing maturity, the degree of
mispricing is such that observed futures prices exceed forward prices as calculated using
equation (7.3). For the 12 month contract, we see from the figure that the degree of mis-
pricing is preferentially positive. This indicates a situation in which the futures price is
higher than the forward price and is in agreement with the previous findings of Park and
Chen (1985) and French (1983).
It is known that increased speculation can affect pricing imperfections. We therefore
expect a relationship between the gold market speculative pressure and the degree of rela-
tive mispricing. Figure (7.2) shows the percentage relative mispricing between the forward
and futures contract versus the level of speculative pressure for the entire sample period.
65
−
0.
6
−
0.
4
−
0.
2
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
−0.0040.0000.004
M
is
pr
ic
in
g 
vs
. S
pe
c.
 P
re
ss
. (
1M
)
S
pe
cu
la
tiv
e
 P
re
ss
ur
e
Mispricing
−
0.
6
−
0.
4
−
0.
2
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
−0.50.00.51.0
M
is
pr
ic
in
g 
vs
. S
pe
c.
 P
re
ss
. (
3M
)
S
pe
cu
la
tiv
e
 P
re
ss
ur
e
Mispricing
−
0.
6
−
0.
4
−
0.
2
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
−0.50.00.51.0
M
is
pr
ic
in
g 
vs
. S
pe
c.
 P
re
ss
. (
6M
)
S
pe
cu
la
tiv
e
 P
re
ss
ur
e
Mispricing
−
0.
6
−
0.
4
−
0.
2
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
−0.50.00.51.0
M
is
pr
ic
in
g 
vs
. S
pe
c.
 P
re
ss
. (
12
M
)
S
pe
cu
la
tiv
e
 P
re
ss
ur
e
Mispricing
Fi
gu
re
7.
2:
PL
O
T
S
O
F
R
E
L
AT
IV
E
FU
T
U
R
E
S
C
O
N
T
R
A
C
T
M
IS
PR
IC
IN
G
V
S.
T
H
E
L
E
V
E
L
O
F
SP
E
C
U
L
AT
IV
E
PR
E
SS
U
R
E
FO
R
VA
R
IO
U
S
FU
T
U
R
E
S
C
O
N
T
R
A
C
T
M
AT
U
R
IT
IE
S
T
he
fig
ur
e
sh
ow
s
th
e
m
is
pr
ic
in
g
be
tw
ee
n
go
ld
fo
rw
ar
d
an
d
fu
tu
re
s
co
nt
ra
ct
s
ag
ai
ns
tt
he
le
ve
lo
f
m
ar
ke
ts
pe
cu
la
tiv
e
pr
es
su
re
.
T
he
bl
ac
k
lin
e
is
a
le
as
t
sq
ua
re
s
re
gr
es
si
on
fit
to
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
da
ta
.
T
he
sl
op
e
be
co
m
es
in
cr
ea
si
ng
ly
po
si
tiv
e
w
ith
in
cr
ea
si
ng
tim
e
to
m
at
ur
ity
of
th
e
co
nt
ra
ct
s.
If
ri
sk
-a
ve
rs
e
sp
ec
ul
at
or
s
re
qu
ir
e
hi
gh
er
ri
sk
-p
re
m
iu
m
s
to
ac
ta
s
co
un
te
r-
pa
rt
ie
s
to
lo
ng
-t
er
m
fu
tu
re
s
co
nt
ra
ct
s.
T
hi
s
be
ha
vi
ou
rw
ou
ld
m
an
if
es
ti
ts
el
f
in
fu
tu
re
pr
ic
es
th
at
in
cr
ea
si
ng
ly
ex
ce
ed
fo
rw
ar
d
pr
ic
es
le
ad
in
g
to
po
si
tiv
e
pr
ic
e
di
ff
er
en
ce
s
an
d,
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
ly
,a
n
up
w
ar
d
sl
op
in
g
re
gr
es
si
on
lin
e.
66
In the plots, we have fitted a regression line to the data. As rate tenor increases, the slope
of the fitted regression lines becomes more negative suggesting that, as tenor increases, the
degree of relative mispricing becomes increasingly negative. Equivalently, this implies that
futures prices increasingly exceed forward prices as speculative pressure increases. If spec-
ulators operate in the long-term market, this suggests that there may be an increased risk
premium attached to longer maturity futures contracts over the respective forward contract.
This may be indicative of a preference by speculators for a higher risk-premium when spec-
ulating on the long-term price of gold. This could be attributed to increasing risk-aversion
among speculators when they bet on prices in the distant future.
To examine possible links between futures-forward mispricing and speculative activ-
ity, we employ a vector autoregression (VAR) model1 to model the dynamic relationship
between the speculative pressure and the various mispricing series. This approach also al-
lows us to obtain impulse response functions for the model. The generalized reduced form
specification of a VAR(푝) model is given by equation (7.5).
풓푡 = 흓0 +Φ풓푡−1 + . . .+Φ푝풓푡−푝 + 휺푡 (7.5)
where 흓0 is a 푘 × 1 vector, Φ is a 푘 × 푘 matrix, and 휺푡 is a serially uncorrelated random
process with zero mean and positive definite variance-covariance matrix Σ and 푝 > 0. It is
common in the literature to assume that 휺푡 is distributed as a multivariate normal. To build
our model, we determine the optimal lag length, 푝 using minimization of the Bayesian
information criteria (BIC). The model is evaluated for multiple lag lengths and the length
that corresponds to the smallest value of the information criteria is used as the lag length 푝
for the VAR(푝) model.
Using weekly data, for the 1, 3, 6 and 12 month contracts along with the speculative
pressure, we test consecutively downwards from a maximum of 푝 = 6 lags, calculating
1Cointegration tests were carried out between speculative pressure and the four mispricing series to de-
termine if a VECM type model for cointegrated series was necessary. Using the Engle and Granger test, for
all series the hypothesis of cointegration was rejected for the 1, 3, 6 and 12 month mispricing series and the
speculative pressure. We do not provide the results of the tests here.
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the associated information criteria, to find the optimal lag length. For comparison, and to
eliminate dependence on a single criteria, we employ three separate measures, the Akaike
(AIC), the Schwarz (BIC) and the Hannin-Quinn (HQ) information criteria. If the individ-
ual criteria select different lag lengths, we first choose any lag length that is selected by
two information criteria. If all three criteria differ, we defer to the BIC selection. Using
this procedure, the information criteria select a lag of 3 for the 1 month series, and a lag of
2 for the 3, 6 and 12 month series. With a lag length of 푝 = 2, equation (7.5) the VAR(2)
model can be written in the more explicit bivariate form of equation (7.6):⎡⎣ 푟1푡
푟2푡
⎤⎦ =
⎡⎣ 휙10
휙20
⎤⎦+
⎡⎣Φ111 Φ112
Φ121 Φ
1
22
⎤⎦⎡⎣ 푟1,푡−1
푟2,푡−1
⎤⎦
+
⎡⎣Φ211 Φ212
Φ221 Φ
2
22
⎤⎦⎡⎣ 푟1,푡−2
푟2,푡−2
⎤⎦+
⎡⎣ 휀1푡
휀2푡
⎤⎦ (7.6)
In terms of the speculative pressure, 푡 and the mispricing, 푀푡, equation (7.6) can be
written as equation (7.7):⎡⎣ 푡
푀푡
⎤⎦ =
⎡⎣ 휙10
휙20
⎤⎦+
⎡⎣Φ111 Φ112
Φ121 Φ
1
22
⎤⎦⎡⎣ 푡−1
푀푡−1
⎤⎦
+
⎡⎣Φ211 Φ212
Φ221 Φ
2
22
⎤⎦⎡⎣ 푡−2
푀푡−2
⎤⎦+
⎡⎣ 휀1푡
휀2푡
⎤⎦ (7.7)
The OLS estimated VAR coefficients are shown in table (7.2).
Looking at the Φ matrices shown in the table, we see that for all maturities, the specu-
lative pressure dynamics are driven by both lagged values of speculative pressure and the
level of mispricing. Conversely, the effect of lagged speculative pressure on the level of
mispricing is statistically significant only for the 3, 6 and 12 month series, suggesting there
exists a linear dependence between the degree of mispricing and the speculative pressure
solely for maturities exceeding 1 month duration. Even though this dependence is exhib-
ited only for the long-term maturities, it is consistent with our finding that the relationship
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Panel A: VAR Model Estimation
Tenor Parameter 흓0 Φ1 Φ2
1 Month
Coefficient
0.0056 1.1557 6.4058 -0.1896 -4.3062
-0.0008 0.0005 0.2930 -0.0002 -0.0737
Std. Err.
0.0047 0.0364 2.6700 0.0364 2.6784
0.0001 0.0005 0.0376 0.0005 0.0377
3 Month
Coefficient
0.0050 1.1552 0.0298 -0.1868 -0.0474
0.0556 0.1829 0.5022 -0.1355 -0.1474
Std. Err.
0.0037 0.0363 0.0169 0.0363 0.0169
0.0081 0.0799 0.0372 0.0800 0.0372
6 Month
Coefficient
0.0051 1.1559 0.0348 -0.1875 -0.0488
0.0711 0.1982 0.5149 -0.1331 -0.1181
Std. Err.
0.0039 0.0362 0.0171 0.0363 0.0171
0.0085 0.0792 0.0373 0.0793 0.0373
12 Month
Coefficient
0.0043 1.1584 0.0369 -0.1909 -0.0411
0.1028 0.2404 0.5008 -0.1489 -0.0840
Std. Err.
0.0045 0.0363 0.0165 0.0364 0.0164
0.0102 0.0825 0.0375 0.0828 0.0373
Table 7.2: VAR(2) MODEL ESTIMATION RESULTS
The table shows the OLS estimated coefficients along with their standard errors for the VAR(2) model defined
in equation (7.5).
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between futures contract returns and the speculative pressure is significant across all ma-
turities: 1, 3, 6 and 12 months. For all maturities, both the lagged mispricing and lagged
speculative pressure are significant determinants of the speculative pressure at time 푡.
To check the models, we test the residuals for serial correlation using the multivariate
Ljung-Box statistic, 푄푘(푚), where 푘 is the dimension of 풓푡 and 푚 is the number of lags
used for the test. This statistic is distributed asymptotically as 휒2 with 푚푘2 − 푔 degrees
of freedom, 푔 being the number of parameters estimated in the VAR model coefficient
matrices. For the 1 month series, the multivariate Ljung-Box statistic is 171.9 using 4 lags,
with a 푝-value of less than 0.0001, suggesting that there is residual serial dependence in the
bivariate return series. For the 3 month series, we have a value of 19.85 for the Ljung-Box
test with an associated 푝-value of 0.3. Somewhat different results are obtained for the 6
month contract with a test statistic of 13.56 and 푝-value of 0.13. Finally, for the 12 month
model, 푄2(4) = 12.96 with a 푝-value of 0.23, indicating that the model is sufficient at the
5% level.
The VAR estimation allows for computation of the impulse response functions between
variables. These functions graphically depict the effect on one variable resulting from an
orthogonal innovation in the associated variable. Figures (7.3) and (7.4) show the impulse
response functions and their 95% confidence intervals for the fitted VAR model of equation
(7.7).
Figure (7.3) shows the response of the speculative pressure to a shock in the degree of
mispricing for the 1, 3, 6 and 12 month difference between the futures price and the theo-
retical forward price. In all instances, the speculative pressure initially increases sharply,
then declines in magnitude over time. This behaviour suggests that speculators respond to
mispricing by increasing their net long positions.
Figure (7.4) contains the impulse response functions for the mispricing series result-
ing from an orthogonal shock in the speculative pressure. Due to the linear dependence
between the mispricing and speculative pressure series, we see similar behaviour in the
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Figure 7.3: THE IMPULSE RESPONSE OF THE SPECULATIVE PRESSURE
FROM AN ORTHOGONAL SHOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF MISPRICING.
Plots of the impulse response functions for the VAR(2) model estimated using weekly observations of the
speculative pressure and futures/forward mispricing. Shown are the responses of speculative pressure to an
innovation in the mispricing. The sample period is from January 1996 to October 2009. Dashed lines indicate
the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 7.4: THE IMPULSE RESPONSE OF THE DEGREE OF MISPRICING
FROM AN ORTHOGONAL SHOCK IN SPECULATIVE PRESSURE.
Plots of the impulse response functions for the VAR(2) model estimated using weekly observations of the
speculative pressure and futures/forward mispricing. Shown are the responses of the 1, 3, 6 and 12 month
mispricing series to an innovation in the speculative pressure. The sample period is from January 1996 to
October 2009. Dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval.
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response of the price difference. A shock in the speculative pressure induces an increase
in the degree of mispricing that decreases slowly after the initial shock, suggesting that
speculative activity can increase the futures price relative to the theoretical forward price.
Chapter 8
The Growth Rate of Gold Forward vs.
Gold Futures Contracts
To compare the rate of increase of the futures price of gold with the market quoted GOFO
rate, the Kalman filter is employed to estimate a model of the joint dynamics between
the gold futures price and the dynamics behind its rate of increase. The Kalman filter is
used for two main reasons. First, under stochastic interest rates, forward and futures prices
differ. This means that we cannot expect the rate of increase of forward contract prices to be
identical to that for futures contracts. Secondly, due to heterogeneity in the expectations of
different classes of traders, futures prices may contain noise which may result in a systemic
price bias (Sanders et al. (1998)). We cannot, therefore, assume that the rate of increase of
the futures contract price is directly observable in the presence of noise. This is equivalent
to assuming that the rate of increase of the futures price of gold is not identically equal to
the GOFO rate and is therefore unobservable.
Consequently, we construct a two-variable state space model using the spot price and
the rate of growth of the gold futures price. For a forward contract, the rate of growth in the
asset price is equal to the GOFO rate. However, under stochastic interest rates, the futures
and forward prices will not be equivalent suggesting that it is appropriate to treat the growth
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rate of the futures contract as a state variable. We denote the gold spot price by 푆푡 where
푡 ∈ [0,∞). The dynamics of the model are specified as follows.
ASSUMPTION 1. The spot price, 푋푡 is treated as a logarithm:
푋푡 = ln푆푡 (8.1)
Let 휇푡 be equal to the the rate of growth in the asset price plus a risk premium term:
휇 = 푡 + 휋 (8.2)
where 푡 is the stochastic rate of growth and 휋 is the risk premium. The market price of
risk can be written:
휆 =
휋
휎
(8.3)
Equations (8.2) and (8.3) give:
휆 =
휇− 푡
휎
(8.4)
where 휎 is the asset volatility. Under these conditions the dynamics of the spot price under
the risk-neutral measure can be written as in Assumption 2.
ASSUMPTION 2. The dynamics of the spot price, 푋푡, under the risk-neutral probabil-
ity measure are governed by the following stochastic differential equation:
푑푆푡
푆푡
= 푡푑푡+ 휎푑푊˜푡 (8.5)
where 푡 is the growth rate at time 푡, and 푊˜푡 is Brownian motion under the ℚ-measure.
Assumption 2 is founded on the basis that the price of gold increases at a rate roughly
approximated by the GOFO rate. Thus, there is a single factor, 푡 that we propose as a
variable suited to modeling the dynamics of the gold price. We corroborate this by noting
that in the Schwartz (1997) paper both the interest rate and the convenience yield are used as
state variables. Conversely, in the case of gold we have argued that the dynamics between
the interest rate (LIBOR) and the convenience yield (derived lease rate) are captured by a
single variable, the GOFO rate, or 푡.
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ASSUMPTION 3. The dynamics of the growth rate, 푡, under the real probability
measure are assumed to follow an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck mean-reverting process:
푑 푡 = 휅 (훼− 푡) 푑푡+ 휂푑퐵푡 (8.6)
where 휅, 훼 and 휂 are constants. We see that 휅 governs the rate of mean reversion and 훼 is
the (constant) long-run mean of the process.
If the GOFO rate represents the rate at which a loan in dollars can be secured using
gold as collateral, then this rate should be mean reverting in the sense that it represents a
relationship between the value of gold and the U.S. dollar. We remark that some of the
results of the unit root tests on the GOFO rate presented in table 5.2 suggest that the GOFO
rate may be mean reverting.
Under the equivalent martingale measure, (8.6) can be written:
푑 푡 = 휅
((
훼− 휂휆
휅
)
− 푡
)
푑푡+ 휂푑퐵˜푡 (8.7)
where 휆 is the market price of interest rate risk. The correlation coefficient, 휌 is given as:
휌푑푡 = 푑푊˜푡푑퐵˜푡 (8.8)
We are working in a complete markets framework1. Consequently, this ensures the
existence and uniqueness of a risk-neutral measure, ℚ. Assumptions 2 and 3 lead to the
following joint stochastic dynamics under the equivalent martingale measure:
푑푆푡
푆푡
= 푡푑푡+ 휎푑푊˜푡 (8.9)
푑 푡 = 휅
((
훼− 휂휆
휅
)
− 푡
)
푑푡+ 휂푑퐵˜푡 (8.10)
where 푑푊ˆ푡 and 푑퐵ˆ푡 are elements of Brownian motion under the risk-neutral measure, ℚ.
Using equation (8.1) and assumption 2, we can derive the joint dynamics for the log-price
1COMEX trades at least 5 liquid gold futures contracts. In our two-factor model we have but a single
source of uncertainty. Thus the number of traded instruments exceeds the number of sources of risk so
markets are complete.
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and asset growth rate:
푑푥푡 =
(
푡 − 휎
2
2
)
푑푡+ 휎푑푊푡 (8.11)
푑 푡 = 휅 (훼− 푡) 푑푡+ 휂푑퐵푡 (8.12)
Within the pricing framework of Cox, Ingersoll and Ross Cox et al. (1985), the price,
퐹 (푋푡, 푡, 푡), of the gold futures contract must satisfy the following partial differential
equation:
∂퐹
∂푡
+ ( 푡 + 휅 (훼−푋푡)) ∂퐹
∂푋푡
+ 푏 (푚− 푡) ∂퐹
∂ 푡
+
1
2
휎2푋
∂2퐹
∂푋2푡
+ 휌휎푋휎
∂2퐹
∂푋푡∂ 푡
+
1
2
휎2
∂2퐹
∂ 2푡
= 0
(8.13)
This is subject to the terminal condition that the expected future spot price converges to the
futures price at maturity, 푇 :
퐹 (푋푇 , 푇 , 푇 ) = 푆(푇 ) = 푒
푋푇 (8.14)
Equation (8.14) will be the basis for the initial conditions that solve the pricing differential
equation, (8.13).
Following Duffie and Kan (1996), the solution to equation (8.13) gives the price of the
futures contract at time to maturity 휏 = (푇 − 푡) under the risk-neutral measure and can be
solved using the following exponential-affine function:
퐹 푇푡 = 퐸푄 (푆푇 ∣ℱ푡) = 푒퐴(휏)+퐵(휏) 푡 (8.15)
Substitution of equation (8.15) into (8.13) yields the following system of differential equa-
tions:
퐵′ (휏) + 휅퐵 (휏)− 1 = 0 (8.16)
퐴′ (휏) + 휅
(
훼− 휂휆
휅
)
퐵 (휏) +
1
2
휂2퐵2 (휏) + 휎휂휌퐵 (휏) = 0 (8.17)
77
with initial conditions given by:
퐴 (휏 = 0) = 0 (8.18)
퐵 (휏 = 0) = 0 (8.19)
(8.20)
The solutions for the system of equations (8.16) are:
퐴 (휏) =
(
−훼
휅
+
2휂휆
휅
+
휂2
휅3
+
휎휂휌
휅2
)
푒−휅휏
+
(
−훼 + 휂휆
휅
+
휂2
2휅2
+
휎휂휌
휅
)
휏 +
1
휅3
(
훼휅2 − 휅휂휆− 3
4
휂2 − 휎휂휌휅
) (8.21)
퐵 (휏) =
1− 푒−휅휏
휅
(8.22)
For our model, these equations, in combination with equation (8.15), govern the price
of a gold futures contract and depend upon six parameters: 훼, 휅, 휆, 휎, 휂 and 휌. These
parameters must be estimated from the observation data. One common method used for
state space model estimation is the Kalman filter. Due to its ease of implementation and
ubiquitous presence in the literature, it provides a convenient method by which to estimate
and compare our model to existing models in the literature, for example that of Schwartz
(1997).
8.1 The Linear Filtering Problem
The Kalman filter is a recursive algorithm that produces estimates of the latent variables of
a dynamical system. It proceeds by updating our knowledge of the system upon the arrival
of a new observation. The state of the system at time 푡 is described by a vector of state
variables. With the arrival of a new observation we apply a linear operator to the state at
time 푡 in order to generate a new state for the system. A second operator is applied (in
the presence of noise) and this generates estimates of the latent state variables. To apply
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the filter to our model, we must first derive the filtering equations. To obtain the requisite
matrices to input into the filter we first have to write our model in a compact state-space
form.
To derive the Kalman filter equations, we have to discretize our continuous time model
in the time domain. To do so we relate the vector of observables 푌 퐹푡 to the state vari-
able vector 푍푡 using a linear Gaussian model. Letting 휏 = 1, . . . , 푇 be the discrete time
observation date index at continuous time date 푡 we have:
푙푛
(
퐹 푇푖푡휏
)
= 푌 퐹휏 = Π휏 + Λ휏푍휏 + 휈휏 (8.23)
whereΠ휏 is an 퐽×1 vector and (푗 = 1 . . . , 퐽) is the number of contract maturities observed
at date 휏 . At a given date, 휏 , we have
Π휏 =
[
퐴 (푡휏 , 푇푖)
]
퐽×1
(8.24)
Λ휏 =
[
퐵 (푡휏 , 푇푖) 퐶 (푡휏 , 푇푖)
]
퐽×2
(8.25)
and 푖 = 1, . . . , 퐽 . The vector 휈휏 is a 퐽 × 1 vector of serially uncorrelated disturbances with
distribution 푁 (0,Ω). Ω is a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements given by Ω푖푖 = 휔푖 for
푖 = 1, . . . , 퐽 .
푍휏 =
⎡⎣ 푋휏−Δ푡
휏−Δ푡
⎤⎦ (8.26)
is the state variable vector and 휏 = 1, . . . , 푇 is the observation time index. Equation (8.23)
is the measurement equation.
To derive the transition equation, we can put equations (8.5) and (8.7) into a compact
matrix form. By letting
Φ푡 =
⎡⎣ −휎22 Δ푡
휅훼Δ푡
⎤⎦ (8.27)
and
Θ =
⎡⎣ 1 Δ푡
0 1− 휅Δ푡
⎤⎦ (8.28)
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the state space form for the model can be written as a linear stochastic differential equation
given by:
푑푍휏 = (Φ휏 +Θ 푍휏 ) 푑푡+ Σ휏푑푊휏 (8.29)
Writing (8.29) in discrete-time gives:
푍푡 = Φ푡 +Θ푡푍푡−Δ푡 +푅휉푡 (8.30)
The variance-covariance matrix of 휉푡 is denoted Σ푡 and is given by
Σ푡 =
⎡⎣ 휎2Δ푡 휌휎휂Δ푡
휌휎휂Δ푡 휂2Δ푡
⎤⎦ (8.31)
Equation (8.30) is the discrete time transition equation.
To perform the filtering we use weekly observations of COMEX gold futures contracts
for the first, third, sixth and twelfth nearby gold futures contract prices over the period of
October 1986 to October 2009 yielding a total of 712 observations. At each observation
date, 푡, we possess data for four contract maturities, 휏푖, 푖 = 1, . . . , 4. Our time series
has been constructed such that the contract maturities at date 푡 are constant and equal to
1
12
, 3
12
, 6
12
and 12
12
. Initialization of the Kalman filter requires that we choose an initial pa-
rameter vector 휙 = {훼, 휅, 휆, 휎, 휂, 휌, ∣ℎ1∣, ∣ℎ3∣, ∣ℎ6∣, ∣ℎ12∣}. Furthermore, we must initialize
the variance-covariance matrix, 퐻 which is a diagonal matrix with elements ℎ21, ℎ
2
3, ℎ
2
6, ℎ
2
12
on the diagonal. With these chosen parameters, we can estimate the parameters using max-
imum likelihood.
8.2 Kalman Filter and Estimation Results
After initialising the parameter vector and the Kalman filter matrices we ran the filter and
obtained the optimised parameter set given in table (8.1).
Table (8.1) displays the results of the log-likelihood estimation of the model parame-
ters. Parameters 휆, ∣ℎ2∣ and ∣ℎ3∣ are not statistically significant. However, all remaining
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Parameter Estimation Std. Err. t-value p-value
휎 1.3618 0.0313 43.5138 0.0000
휅 0.2396 0.0245 9.7779 0.0000
훼 0.0248 0.0167 1.4805 0.1392
휆 0.0000 0.2853 0.0000 1.0000
휂 0.0163 0.0006 25.3381 0.0000
휌 0.4255 0.0324 13.1239 0.0000
ℎ1 -0.0024 0.0001 36.1522 0.0000
ℎ3 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 0.9999
ℎ6 -0.0005 0.0000 -32.3597 0.0000
ℎ12 0.0003 0.0001 3.9473 0.0001
Log-Likelihood -11778.7
Table 8.1: KALMAN FILTER ESTIMATION RESULTS
Parameter vector optimisation results from the log-likelihood maximization. Parameters 휆, 훼, ∣ℎ3∣ and ∣ℎ12∣
are not statistically significant. The remaining parameters are significant at the < 1% level.
parameters are significant at the < 1% level. We observe that the market price of risk, 휆
is not statistically significant which is in agreement with the results of the Schwartz (1997)
two-factor model which finds a statistically insignificant market price of risk for the peri-
ods of 1/2/85 to 6/13/95, 11/21/90 to 6/13/95 and 11/21/90 to 6/13/95. However, our model
differs from Schwartz’s two factor model in that he uses the futures price and convenience
yield as state variables. Owing to the persistent state of contango in the gold market, the
convenience yield2 for gold is low. For this reason, the use of convenience yield as a state
variable for a gold price model may not be appropriate and could lead to excessive negative
values of the convenience yield for gold. While possible, frequent negative values are not
often observed in practice and we should keep this in mind if we accept the derived lease
rate as a suitable proxy for the convenience yield of gold.
Figures (8.1) and (8.2) graphically depict the results of the Kalman filter estimation
of the joint system dynamics. In figure (8.1), we can observe a positive and consistent
2i.e. the derived lease rate.
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difference between the 3 month GOFO rate and the Kalman filtered asset growth rate. The
figure suggests that since approximately 2003 until the end of 2007, the futures contract
price has been priced consistently higher than the forward contract price. In terms of our
model, this has the interpretation of an additional risk-premium in the value of the futures
contract compared to the forward contract. It is interesting to note that the disappearance of
the risk-premium coincides approximately with the beginning of the recent financial crisis.
This effect is depicted more clearly by the absolute difference between the filtered and
quoted GOFO rate as illustrated by figure (8.2). The figure shows the absolute difference
between the two series and the consistent positive difference can easily be seen beginning
in the early part of 2003 and lasting until the end of 2007. It is this difference between the
two growth rates that seems to be responsible for the degree of mispricing between the gold
forward and futures contracts. This positive discrepancy between the two rates will be the
subject of future research.
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Chapter 9
Transaction Costs and Profitability of
Trading Strategies
In this section, we examine the potential profitability of two common commodity-trading
strategies. In particular, we consider whether the cash and carry and reverse cash and carry
strategies can be profitable to an investor in the gold market. The reverse cash and carry
trade is profitable if, at time 푡 an investor observes that 퐹0 < 푆0푒(퐺푂퐹푂)푇 . Under this
condition, an investor can lease bullion from a central bank, sell the leased gold on the spot
market and invest the proceeds of this sale at LIBOR. Because the gold must be repurchased
at the end of the trade, an investor can secure the otherwise risky repurchase price at 퐹0 by
taking a long position in the futures contract.
Using gold futures contract data for contracts of 1, 3, 6 and 12 month maturity, we
calculate the potential profitability of the reverse cash and carry trade in the gold market.
Figure 9.1 shows time series of potential profitability of the reverse cash and carry trade of
1, 3, 6 and 12 month maturity for the years spanning 1996 - 2009.
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The results for the one month maturity trade duration indicate that the reverse cash and
carry trade is potentially profitable in the short-term. However, as contract maturity in-
creases, we see from the 3, 6 and 12 month plots that possible profit becomes increasingly
negative; for the 12 month contract there is a negative profit of 6 U.S. dollars, suggesting
an investor engaging in the 12 month reverse cash and carry would realize a significant
loss. For the 1 month contract, average profitability is approximately 0.43 U.S. dollars,
suggesting that transaction costs and/or taxes may render the reverse cash and carry trade
in gold an overall unprofitable trading strategy. However, diminishing profit with increas-
ing duration renders the cash and carry trade unattractive for long term trading strategies.
Conversely, the cash and carry trade is profitable if we observe 퐹0 > 푆0푒(퐺푂퐹푂)푇 . Under
this inequality, it is potentially profitable for the investor to obtain a loan for 푆0 at the LI-
BOR rate, purchase a unit of gold, short a futures contract and hold the gold until maturity.
For the duration of the carry, the investor can earn the lease rate on the bullion. At maturity,
the investor delivers the gold and earns a profit of 퐹0 − 푆0푒(퐺푂퐹푂)푇 . Unlike the reverse
cash and carry strategy, the cash and carry trade is not profitable in the short-term but is
profitable in the long-term.
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Figure (9.2) shows a plot of potential profitability of the gold cash and carry trade. In
further contrasts to the reverse cash and carry, the profitability is inversely related to the
GOFO rate and is positively related to the derived gold lease rate. The 1 month cash and
carry strategy proves unprofitable, on average, over the entire sample period from 1996 to
2009 and becomes increasingly unprofitable from 2004 onwards. In contrast, the 3, 6 and
12 month profitability series suggest that the carry trade has been a profitable strategy and,
particularly for the 12 month contract, is increasing in profitability in recent times. Since
2002, the 12 month series is almost strictly positive and increasing. Potential profits are as
high as 6 U.S. dollars on a troy ounce of gold. Furthermore, the magnitude of the profit
suggests that after accounting for taxes and transaction costs, the long-term cash and carry
may remain a profitable trade.
To estimate gold futures transaction costs we employed the method of Lesmond et al.
(1999). To estimate proportional costs, Lesmond et al. employ the limited dependent
variable (LDV) model of Tobin (1958). The method consists of observing the frequency of
zero returns in a yearly series and therefore comparing measured and “true” returns to one
another. The difference between the measured and true return is given by the threshold cost
of trading on negative and positive returns. These costs can be thought of as the costs at
which a marginal investor will be willing to engage in a transaction. By estimating the log-
likelihood function for the LDV model linking measured and true returns, we are able to
extract the proportional costs of gold futures buying and selling in addition to the round-trip
transaction costs.
The LDV model assumes the relationship between measured and true returns to be a
linear function of the proportional transaction costs of selling, 훼1, and buying, 훼2. These
coefficients can also be thought of as the threshold costs of trading on negative information
in the case of 훼1, and the threshold for trading on positive information in the case of 훼2.
The basic formulation of the LDV model is therefore given by equation (9.1):
푅∗푡 = 훽푅푚푡 + 휖푡 (9.1)
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where 푅∗푡 are the true returns to gold futures, 푅푡 are the measured returns, and 푅푚푡 repre-
sents the market returns on the S&P500 index. Subsequently, we have:
푅푡 = 푅
∗
푡 − 훼1 for 푅∗푡 < 훼1
푅푡 = 0 for 훼1 < 푅∗푡 < 훼2 (9.2)
푅푡 = 푅
∗
푡 − 훼2 for 푅∗푡 > 훼2
To estimate the transaction costs, we maximize the log-likelihood function of equation
(9.1). This function is given in Lesmond et al. (1999) and is defined by:
ln퐿 =
∑
푟푡휖푅1
ln
1
(2휋휎2)1/2
−
∑
푟푡휖푅1
1
2휎2
(푅푡 + 훼1 − 훽푅푚푡)2
+
∑
푟푡휖푅2
ln
1
(2휋휎2)1/2
−
∑
푟푡휖푅2
1
2휎2
(푅푡 + 훼2 − 훽푅푚푡)2 (9.3)
+
∑
푟푡휖푅0
ln
(
Φ2
(
훼2 − 훽푅푚푡
휎
)
− Φ1
(
훼1 − 훽푅푚푡
휎
))
The sets 푅0, 푅1, 푅2, in the summation indices correspond to regions in which returns are
zero, returns are non-zero when 푅푚 is negative and when returns are non-zero when 푅푚
is positive, respectively. The functions Φ1 and Φ2 are standard normal distribution func-
tions. The likelihood maximization procedure thus provides estimates of the parameter set
(훼1, 훼2, 훽, 휎).
Table (9.1) shows the results of the log-likelihood maximization for Tobin’s LDV model.
In the table, 훽 represents the regression coefficient of true returns on measured returns, 훼1
and 훼2 are the proportional costs of buying and selling, respectively. Round trip costs are
calculated as the difference between the proportional costs of buying and selling. We see
from the table that round-trip costs for the latter half of the 1990s were small in compari-
son to the post-2000 years. The one exception is 1999, where the highest round trip costs
of the sample period peaked at approximately 6 percent. The post 2000 years have seen
transaction costs consistently in excess of 3.5%, which, as a yearly average, is not pro-
hibitively high. In particular, costs of this magnitude would have only a marginal impact
90
Year 휷 휶1 휶2 흈 Round-trip
1996 1.1443 -0.0131 0.0129 0.0401 0.0260
1997 1.0063 -0.0179 0.0179 0.0844 0.0358
1998 0.6623 -0.0124 0.0112 0.0869 0.0236
1999 2.0049 -0.0284 0.0312 0.1209 0.0595
2000 1.3857 -0.0251 0.0283 0.1037 0.0534
2001 1.5075 -0.0282 0.0282 0.1078 0.0564
2002 0.7056 -0.0178 0.0183 0.0901 0.0361
2003 -0.2264 -0.0013 0.0010 0.1119 0.0023
2004 2.2309 -0.0211 0.0179 0.1093 0.0390
2005 3.1244 -0.0302 0.0232 0.0938 0.0535
2006 4.1802 -0.0375 0.0319 0.1592 0.0694
2007 0.2529 -0.0015 0.0010 0.1171 0.0026
2008 0.0297 -0.0029 0.0025 0.2139 0.0054
2009 0.7644 -0.0223 0.0187 0.1605 0.0410
Averages: 1.955232 -0.021310 0.018430 0.102861 0.039740
Table 9.1: GOLD FUTURES TRANSACTION COST ESTIMATES BY YEAR
The table shows transaction costs estimated using the method in Lesmond et al. (1999). Costs were estimated
on a year-by-year basis using a full year of daily returns data based on the linear dependent variable (LDV)
model. In the table, 훼1 and 훼2 represent the proportional transaction costs for selling and buying, respectively.
Round trip transaction costs are estimated by subtracting 훼1 from 훼2. The coefficients were estimated by
maximizing the log-likelihood function given in Lesmond et al. (1999).
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on the profitability of the cash and carry and reverse cash and carry strategies mentioned
previously.
Chapter 10
Conclusion
By examining the gold bullion leasing market, we have shown that the derived lease rate can
serve as an observable form of the convenience yield of gold. Under such a framework, we
demonstrate a short-term relationship between the lease rate and the level of discretionary
market inventory. In particular, we have shown that bullion leases of 1 month duration
have a strong impact on inventory levels. Due to the nature of the gold leasing transaction,
whereby interest on a bullion lease is repaid in bullion, our results suggest that the 1 month
lease rate has a negative effect on inventories such that lease repayments cause inventory
levels to fall. However, this effect seems to be mitigated by the actions of speculators whose
demand for long futures contracts results in increased inventory levels. Additionally, this
speculative effect is seen to be consistent independent of the lease rate duration. Despite
this, the lease rate does not appear to influence the size of inventory withdrawals. Rather,
past withdrawals appear to decrease inventory withdrawals at time 푡, suggesting that gold
inventories are replenished rather quickly. This could also explain the absence of influence
of inventories on the price of gold.
Returns to futures contracts are negatively related to the market portfolio as proxied by
the return on the S&P 500 index, suggesting that adding gold to an investment portfolio
has diversification benefits and can possibly offset falls in the equity market. We have also
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shown that speculative pressure is positively and significantly related to futures returns.
Controlling for price pressure, we show that while the price pressure hypothesis dominates
speculative effects for futures returns calculated from short-term contracts, we cannot reject
the idea that long-term speculation has a positive effect on gold futures returns. That is,
increased speculative activity in gold futures contracts is associated with higher futures
returns. Estimates of gold futures transaction costs are rather small, suggesting that these
costs are not a significant barrier to speculator entry in the gold market.
Finally, our state space model has revealed a curious relationship between the GOFO
rate and the dynamics of the gold price. In particular, there appears to be an interesting
decoupling of the GOFO rate and the growth rate of gold futures contract prices. In the
period beginning late 2003 until the approximate onset of the recent crisis, there is evidence
of a distinct and positive difference between the market quoted GOFO rate and the Kalman
filter estimated growth rate. As both the investment banks implicated in the crisis and the
central banks that provided liquidity support were both active participants in the gold and
money markets, this decoupling will be the subject of further inquiry.
Historically, monetary authorities and the hedging activities of gold producers dom-
inated the gold market. However, rising prices, diminishing lease rates and shareholder
pressure on gold miners in the presence of rising gold prices seems to have changed the
market dynamics. The decreases in producer hedging activity and increased demand for
gold as a financial asset have lead to increased speculative activity in the bullion market.
The subsequent recent participation and activities of gold ETFs may lead to an even more
fundamental change in the operation of the gold futures market and this may provide a
productive avenue for future research.
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By examining the gold leasing market and employing data on the gold forward offered
rate (GOFO) and derived lease rates, we propose that rather than using the interest-adjusted
basis as a proxy for the convenience yield of gold, the convenience yield is better approx-
imated by the derived gold lease rate. Additionally, using the interest-adjusted basis as
opposed to the lease rate can lead to incorrect inferences pertaining to the convenience
yield. Using the lease rate, we study the relationship between gold leasing and the level of
COMEX discretionary inventory. The results suggest that the lease rate has an asymmet-
ric relationship with the level of discretionary inventory, which we calculate using weekly
inventory data obtained from the COMEX futures trading exchange. Linear regressions of
the level of discretionary inventory on lagged lease rates reveal that lease rate tenors of 1, 3
and 6 months have a negative effect on the level of discretionary inventory. After control-
ling for speculative effects we find that for bullion leases exceeding one month in duration
inventory levels are dominated by speculative effects rather than lease rates. Furthermore,
this speculative activity acts to increase the amount of bullion available to the gold futures
market by decreasing the repayment effect. Finally, we show that the presence of specula-
tion in gold futures contracts can be associated with increased futures contract returns and
that this effect increases with increased futures contract maturity. These results suggest that
speculation plays a significant role in the COMEX gold futures market.
Key words: commitments of traders, gold futures market, convenience yield, gold leasing,
speculative effects
A` travers l’examen du marche´ de l’emprunt d’or et l’utilisation a` la fois des donne´es rela-
tives aux taux a` terme offerts sur ce marche´ (GOFO) et aux taux du leasing de l’or, nous
sugge´rons l’adoption de ce dernier taux comme e´tant une << proxy >> pour quantifier
le rendement de l’or. Une telle approche permet de reme´dier aux insuffisances d’une ap-
pxoximation par un adjustement du diffe´rentiel de taux (interest-adjusted basis). En effet,
l’utilisation de ce dernier est sujette a` des biais d’infe´rence aboutissant a` une estimation
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errone´e du rendement de l’actif en question. Dans ce contexte, il est naturel d’utiliser le
taux le plus approprie´, en l’occurrence le taux d’emprunt (lease rate) pour e´tudier la re-
lation entre l’emprunt de l’or et le niveau d’inventaire du COMEX. Enfin, notre analyse
re´ve`le qu la pre´sence de spe´culateurs sur les marche´s des contrats a` terme est un facteur
d’accroissement a` la fois des rendements, mais aussi des maturite´s des contrats futures.
Mots cle´s: commitments of traders, marche´ a` terme de l’or, convenience yield, gold leas-
ing, effets spe´culatifs
